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1. 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is intended in this paper to consider the array _of 
ministerial powers conferred by the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973. We will begin by noting the scope of these 
powers and the statutory language in which they are 
expressed. Following this analysis consideration will 
be given to some of the possible procedures and grounds 
available to challenge the exercise of ~hese ministerial 
powers, including an indication of the potential attitude 
of the courts to such actions. 
Our initial starting point should however be to consider 
some of the wider policy issues which may be taken into 
1 
account by the courts in addition to the actual statutory 
language which confers the power. When undertaking an 
inquiry into the exercise of a ministerial power in the 
industrial relations sphere the courts would have a wide 
range of responses available to them. There is no clear 
cut or immediately apparent answer as to the exact approach 
which the courts would take as the exercise of a ministerial 
power pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act 1973 or 
its predecessors has never been challenged in the courts. 
Whether there are causes of action into which such a 
challenge could be fitted is the issue it is hoped to 
canvass in Part IV of this paper. The courts' response 
to these avenues of challenge will be determined by the 
statutory language and relevant policy considerations. 
1. Excluding the Arbitration Court 
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·rt must be asked whether the c..ourts would or should 
take the same approach to a ~nisterial decision 
concerning an industrial relations matter as it would 
to a decision concerning national security. The latter 
area is one in which the courts have traditionally 
declined to review a decision by a Minister.
2 Another 
area in which the courts have been slow to intervene is 
in the field of immigration. However a successful review 
action was taken against the Minister in Daganayasi v. 
Minister of Irnmigration
3 to which we will return. The 
New Zealand Court of Appeal adopted a more passive approach 
though in the case of Ashby v . . Minister of Immigration. 
4 
That case concerned the Minister's exercise of his dis-
cretionary power pursuant to section 14 of the Immigration 
Act 1964 in granting temporary entry permits to the 
Springboks. Richardson J. considered this to be a 
non-justiciable issue emphasising that "immigration 
policy is a sensitive and often controversial political 
issue 115 which involved the conduct of foreign relations 
and the national interest. Cooke J. was not prepared 
however to hold that the Minister's exercise of his 
discretion under section 14 could never be reviewed by 
the c..ourts. 
2. For example Regina v. Secretary of State For Home Affairs, 
3. 
Ex parte Hosenball ~97~ 1 WLR 766 where the English 
Court of Appeal held that where national security was 
involved the ordinary principles of natural justice 
were modified for the protection of the realm. 
[19 80] 2 NZLR 130 
4. [19 81J 1 NZLR 222 
5. Ibid p231 
..) . 
Thus we see the courts reluctant to intervene in issues 
that they perceive to be the proper and sole domain of 
the Government of the day. The question is whether a 
decision taken by tne Minister under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 would be viewed as coming within this 
category. As mentioned above, there is some indication 
in Ashby v. Minister of Immigration6 that the Court of 
Appeal would treat each case on its merits rather than 
adopting a blanket approach of refusing to ever review 
a particular discretion. As in the Ashby 7 case the 
court will no doubt consider the role of Government 
policy in the decision taken and consequently the role 
adopted by the Government in the industrial relations 
system. 
It is submitted however that there is no "consistent 
agreement regarding the role which the State has to 
play in industrial relations. 118 It has been suggested 
that the Government's role stems from its responsibility 
to protect the public interest. 9 Such an argument would 
appear to be very similar to those made in Hosenball's lO 
case concerning national security. However the Government's 
role nas also been framed in terms of providing 
6. Supra n.4 
7. Idem 
8. R.S. Rudman Government Intervention In Industrial 
Relations. A New Zealand Perspective 
(Victoria University of Wellington, 
Industrial Relations Centre, 1977) p2 
9. Idem 
10.Supra n.2 
-1 • 
",.,adequate machinery for the 
peaceful settlement of Industrial 
disputes and that the machinery is 
up-to-date and flexible enough to 
cope with problems raised by the 
changing needs of our industrial 
structure. 
(Secondly) .. to provide guidelines 
for the safety, he:~l th and welfare 
of persons in employment in the 
form of minimum standards. 
(Thirdly) .. to promote and encour-
age good relationships between 
employers and unions at all levels; 
including their organisation into 
effective bargaining units." 11 
The argument concerning the role of the Government is 
flffther confused by the fact that "intervention in 
New Zealand has largely resulted from pragmatic or 
• • 1 • • II 12 expedient responses to particu ar situations. 
The role adopted by the Government has not therefore 
been constant over time. This means that the ~ourt 
may be faced with widely divergent arguments in any 
one case as to the level of policy input in a 
~inisterial decision taken pursuant to a power 
conferred by the Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
11. Supra n. 7 
12. Supra n.7 p5 
5 • 
Such divergence may in itself be sufficient to indicate 
to the court that the area of industrial relations 
should not be treated in the same way as for example 
national security. The fact that it is not unanimously 
percieved to be an area for the sole determination of 
the Government of the day may be sufficientjat the very 
least, for the court to consider each case on its merits. 
These arguments must also be viewed in light of the 
language used in the particular statutory provision 
being considered. The wording may be sufficiently wide 
for the decision to be a highly political one which 
should properly be sanctioned by Parliament and the 
electorate and not by the ~ourts. Conversely the 
Minister's decision may be required by the statute to 
be based on facts which are easily determined by the 
courts. 
The wide range of statutory language used to confer 
powers on the Minister and the possible implications 
of each will be discussed in Parts 111 and lV of the 
paper but for the present purposes the differing scope 
for the input of Government policy can be seen from 
the following two examples. Section 134(1) provides for 
the Minister to give notice in the Gazette of the 
registration of a new union if he is "satisfied that 
a new union of employers, or, as the case may require, 
of workers, representing the employers or the workers 
who were represented by the deregistered union has been 
registered under this Act." It is contended that there 
b. 
is little scope for the input of Government policy 
into the decision of the Minister in this case as 
whether a new union has been registered will be a 
matter of fact easily discovered by the court 
through the Registrar of Industrial Unions. Whether 
the new union represents those covered by the deregis-
tered union may be determined by an examination of the 
description of the industry to be covered by each union. 
These are matters which evidence before the court could 
firmly establish. As a contrast to this is the provision 
in section 130(1) which givesthe Minister power to dereg-
ister a union if he is "satisfied" that "in respect of 
any discontinuance of employment it has caused or is 
likely to cause serious loss or inconvenience and that 
it has been b<ought about wholly or partly by any union 
of employers or of workers or by any member or members 
thereof ... " . In this instance the power of the Minister 
is also based on a satisfaction that certain circumstances 
exist. They are however much more vague than those in 
section 134(1). For example Government policy may deter-
mine the exact level at which serious loss or inconven-
ience is caused. A court may be reluctant to replace 
the Minister's determination of a serious loss or incon-
venience with its own and probably more reluctant to 
impose its judgment of future events, as to whether 
serious loss or inconvenience is likely, on the Minister. 
The courts may be more willing to leave these rather more 
vague matters to be decided by the Minister according to 
Government policy than it would the circumstances in 
section 134(1) which do not involve the subjective 
judgments required by section 130(1). 
The court may look further than the words of the specific 
provision of the statute that is in question to the overall 
scheme of the Act. The fact that the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973 establishes a specialist court in the Arbitration 
Court may indicate that the Legislature intended all indust-
rial matters to be dealt with by that court. A limited 
right of appeal is given by section bl~to the Court of 
Appeal and the ability to seek review is limited by the 
privative clause in section 48(7). These limitations 
are also an indication of a statutory attempt to keep 
industrial matters within the specialist court and many 
of the procedures in the Act are designed to settle 
disputes without reference to any court. For example 
the section 117 personal grievance procedure. Another 
section which may be interpreted as illustrating that 
the Act is designed to operate outside the normal court 
system is section 54(4) whereby barristers and solicitors 
may not appear before the Arbitration Court in arbitration 
proceedings except with the consent of all parties. 
Arguments may therefore be made,based on the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 as a whole,that the courts should be 
slow to intervene in an area which by statute they are 
given only a limited role. This would nave to be weighed 
against such considerations as the seriousness of the 
interests involved and whether there are any alternative 
safeguards provided by the legislation. 
0 . 
The courts may be influenced in favour of exercising 
some form of control over the powers conferred by 
the Industrial Relations Act 1973 due to the number 
of international conventions which are applicable to 
this area. In Ashby v. Minister of I~igration13 
Richardson J. acknowledged New Zealand's respon-
sibilities under such treaties although he stopped 
short of requiring the Minister to separately identify 
and consider the Racial Discrimination Convention. In 
the industrial relations sphere there are for example 
many International Labour Organisation Conventions, 
some of which bind New Zealand as they have been 
ratified by this country whilst others simply indicate 
' 
the appropriate standards, duties and obligations of 
the parties involved. These international conventions 
could provide the basis for an argument that the 
decision is in fact not open to political whim alone 
but must be made in accordance with established 
international legal standards. 
It is submitted that, even though a decision taken by 
a Minister pursuant to powers conferred by the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 may be based to some 
extent on government policy that alone would not 
be sufficient reason for a court to decline to 
consider the decision. Neither, it is contended, would 
a court refuse to consider such a decision merely because 
it concerned industrial relations. 
13. Supra n. 4 p231 
9 • 
There is no history of the courts adopting this 
approach compared for example to the area of national 
security and the exact role of the Government is unclear. 
Thus we are left with the probable result of the Court 
looking at each individual case on its merits. From 
the Court of Appeal's attitude to appeals from and review 
of Arbitration Court decisions there is an indication 
that the ~ourt would adopt a passive approach deferring 
to a more specialist decision-maker in the field of 
industrial relations. This issue will be more fully 
discussed in Part lV of this paper. It is however the 
statutory language of the provision in question that 
will initially determine, the grounds on which the 
ministrial actions are able to be challenged,and 
the approach adopted by the courts. It is to an 
analysis of those statutory provisions that we now 
turn. 
10. 
II STATUTORY POWERS 
Since the passing of the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1894 the government has become an 
integral part of the New Zealand industrial relations 
system. The current role of the Minister of Labour 
in the industrial relations sphere is largely 
determined by the 1894 Act's successor, the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973. Before turning to a consideration 
of judicial control of these powers it is necessary to 
outline the specific provisions in the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 which confer on the Minister of 
Labour, hereinafter referred to as the Minister, some 
form of decision-making power. 
A. Ministerial powers of appointment 
In relation to the Industrial Conciliation Service and 
the Industrial Mediation Service pursuant to sections 
63(2) and 64(2) respectively the Minister is given the 
power of reconunending to the Governor-General the 
persons to be appointed to these services. This 
power is however wider in one context than the 
other,section 63(2) reads: 
11 'l'he service shall consist of 
conciliators who shall be appointed 
by the Governor-General on the recom-
mendation of the Minister to exercise 
the powers and jurisdiction conferred 
on them by this Act. 11 
11. 
By comparison section 64(2) imposes a duty of consultation 
on the Minister, it reads: 
"The service shall consist of 
mediators, who shall be appoint-
ed by the Governor-General on the 
recommendation of the Minister 
after consultation with the central 
organisations." 
The Central organisations referred to are defined in 
section 2 to be the central organisation of employers 
and the central organisation of workers. Currently 
these bodies would be the Employers' Federation and 
the Federation of Labour. Mediators and conciliators 
so appointed hold office for three years and are eligible 
for reappointment from time to time. In both services 
those appointed may at any time be removed from office 
by the Governor-General pursuant to sections 68(6) 
and 64 (8) respectively. 
The functions and powers of a conciliator as given 
by subsections t3Jand Wlof section 63 are primarily 
concerned with the administration of conciliation 
council for the hearing of disputes of interest. 
By comparison the functions of a mediator as 
established by section 64(3) and 64(4) are to 
assist employers, unions and workers to carry out 
their responsibilities to establish and maintain 
harmonious industrial relations. The role of the 
12. 
mediator is to work closely with both the employers 
and workers to endeavour to prevent industrial disputes. 
It is suggested that the extra requirement in section 
64(2) that the Minister consult with the central organ-
isations before making his recommendation to the 
Governor-General is appropriate due to the close rapport 
with these organisations that a mediator is required to 
establish. A conciliator does not have the same statutory 
function of maintaining a close and continuous liaison 
with the parties in industry and this may explain the 
Or'Y'lission in section 63(2) of a requirement on the Minister 
to consult with the central organisations. 
In respect of both services temporary appointments may be 
made but the discretion to create these positions rests 
with different persons. The section 63(7) power to appoint 
a temporary conciliator for a period less than three years 
is exercisable by the Governor-General. The section 64(9) 
discretionary power to appoint a temporary mediator is, 
in contrast, conferred on the Minister and appointments 
are restricted to a specified period not exceeeding 
twelve months or, to be in connection with any dispute 
that has arisen. The potential tenure of office for 
a rninisterial appointed mediator is therefore shorter 
than that of a temporary conciliator appointed by the 
Governor-General. 
13. 
The terms in which these two discretions are conferred 
by the statute also differ. Section 63(7) simply states 
that the "Governor-General may from time to time appoint 
a conciliator in a temporary capacity." Section 64(9) 
by contrast is in the terms that "the Minister may, when 
he considers it desirable, appoint a person to beamed-
iator to act in a temporary capacity." Whether these 
extra words have any effect on the ability of the courts 
to review a decision of the Minister in contrast to the 
Governor-General will be discussed at a later stage of 
this paper. 
The Minister also has the responsibility of appointing 
three persons to the Conscientous Objection Committee 
which is established by section 108. The appointment 
of the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and deputy members is 
also performed by the Minister. The Chairman, being 
one of the three committee members may, pursuant to 
section 110, be removed from office by the Minister 
for disability, bankruptcy, neglect of duty, or miscon-
duct, proved to the satisfaction of the Minister. The 
Deputy Chairman o"d deputy members however hold office 
during the Minister's pleasure, affording little 
security of tenure. The Minister is given, by 
these sections total control of the appointment of 
members of the Conscientious Objection Committee. 
B. Powers to Intervene in Disputes 
The further power of appointment exercised by the 
Minister is of a different nature as it is not 
connected to any of the permanent bodies established 
by the statute. It is the power to appoint a comm-
ittee of inquiry conferred on the Minister by 
section 121 in the circumstances prescribed by 
section 120. 
120. Power of Minister to call compulsory 
conference in case of strike or lockout -
(1) Where the Minister has reasonable grounds 
for believing that a strike or lockout exists 
or is threatened, he may, if he thinks fit 
call a compulsory conference of the parties 
to the dispute or their representatives in 
an endeavour to secure a settlement of the 
dispute, and appoint any person to be chair-
man of the conference with power, if the 
Minister thinks fit, to make a decision 
settling the dispute. 
(3) In addition to the parties or repre~e~to.-
tives of the parties to the dispute, the 
Minister may also require the attendance 
at the conference of any person whose 
attendance would in the opinion of the 
Minister be likely to assist in securing 
a settlement of the dispute. 
(4) Where the Minister has conferred on 
the chairman of the conference the power 
to make a decision settling the dispute and -
(a) The parties, or their representatives, 
who attend the conference are unable to 
agree on a settlement; or 
15. 
(b) The parties fail to attend or to be 
represented at the conference -
the chairman may make a decision settling 
the dispute; and the chairman's decision 
shall be final and binding on the parties. 
The Minister is under an initial oblig·ation to have 
"reasonable grounds for believing" that a strike or 
lockout exists. It is probable that "may" when followed 
by "if he thinks fit" will confer on the Minister a 
discretion to call a compulsory conference and appoint 
a chairman. The same wording can be interpreted as 
giving the Minister a further discretion as to the powers 
of the chairman. 
Th~ composition of the conference is not limited to the 
parties involved in the dispute but may be ~u9mented 
by the Minister if the persons would in his opinion be 
likely to assist in securing a settlement of the dispute . 
It is contended that the subjective wording of subsectionl3), 
"in the opinion of" coupled with "may" confers on the 
Minister a discretion as to the composition of the 
compulsory conference. 
The Minister's use of the section 120 power in the 
14 
last three years has been . 
Year ended 31 March 19 79 15 
Year ended 31 March 1980 12 
Year ended 31 March 1981 6 
14. Report of Department of Labour for year ended 
31 March 1980 p25 
Report of Department of Labour for year ended 
31 March 1981 p28 
16. 
Instead of or in addition to a section 120 compulsory 
conference the Minister is given the power to appoint 
a committee of inquiry pursuant to section 121, 
121 Power of Minister to appoint committee of 
inquiry-
In any case to which section 120 of this Act 
applies, the Minister may if he thinks fit, 
instead of or in addition to calling a 
compulsory conference under that section, 
appoint a committee of inquiry with the 
power to inquire into the matter of the 
dispute generally or into such aspects 
of it as the Minister specifies. 
(2) The committee shall consist of an equal 
number of persons to represent respectively 
the employers and the workers concerned in 
the dispute, together with a chairman; but 
if the Minister thinks fit the committee 
may consist of one person. 
(3) The committee shall be deemed to be a 
Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry 
Act 1908, and the provisions of that Act, 
except sections 2, 4A and 10 to 12, shall 
apply accordingly. 
(4) The committee shall report the results 
of its inquiry and its findings to the 
Minister. A copy of the report shall be 
made available by the Minister to each of 
the parties concerned in the dispute. 
(5) The minister may publish the report of 
the committee or a summary of the report. 
17. 
It should be noted that before the Minister can appoint 
a committee of inquiry he must first have "reasonable 
grounds for believing" that a certain set of circum-
stances exists or is threatened. The Minister then has 
a discretion as to whether he appoints a committee of 
inquiry, expressed by the statute in terms of "may if 
he thinks fit." The Minister may decide if he "thinks 
fit" to appoint a one-man Commission but if he chooses 
not to do so subsection (2) imposes the condition of 
equal representation of workers and employers. The 
scope of the inquiry to be undertaken by the committee 
is specified by the Minister. The use of "shall" in 
subsection (4) is to be contrasted with the use of 
"may" in subsection (5). It is submitted that subsection 
C41 would be interpreted as to require the Minister to 
make the report available to the parties but that in 
subsection (5) "may" confers on the Minister a discre-
tion as to whether the report or a surrunary of it is 
published. 
The number of times that the Minister has used his 
section 121 powers over the last three years is as 
follows: 
15 
Year ended 31 March 1979 6 
Year ended 31 March 1980 2 
Year ended 31 March 1981 2 
15. Idem 
18. 
Sections 120 and 121 conferred on the Minister the 
powers to endeavour to settle a dispute by calling a 
compulsory conference and/or appointing a committee 
of inquiry. Sections 125B and 125C as inserted by 
section 9 of the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 
1981 provide further powers for the settlement of 
disputes in essential industry or export slaughter-
houses. 
125B 
Power of Minister to refer to conciliator 
mediator, or other person existing or 
threatened strike or lockout affecting 
essential industry or export slaughter-
house -
(1) Where the Minister is of the opinion,-
(a) That a strike or lockout exists 
or is threatened in an essential 
industry or an export slaughterhouse; 
and 
(b) That the strike or lockout sub-
stantially affects or will substant-
ially affect the public interest,-
he may request a conciliator or mediator 
or some other person appointed by the 
Minister to inquire into the matter of 
the dispute. 
(2) The conciliator, mediator, or other 
person to whom the matter of a dispute 
iS ,~£erred under subsection (1) of this 
section shall be requested-
(a) To -
(i) Inquire into tne facts of the dispute; 
or 
(ii) Both inquire into the facts of the 
dispute and endeavour to secure a settle-
ment of the dispute; and 
(b) To report to the Minister 
-------
1111 
• 
1111 
---------
19. 
The powers conferred by section 125B are similar to 
those contained in section 121. Section 121 allows 
for a one man committee of inquiry to be appointed by 
the Minister and the same effect is achieved pursuant 
to section 125B. The Minister is able to appoint a 
mediator or conciliator or some other person under 
both section 121 and 125B. In contrast to section 
121, section 125B contains an explicit description 
of the scope of the inquiry whereas under section 121 
tile scope of the inquiry is specified by the Minister. 
In order for the Minister to implement section 125B 
he must be of the opinion that the specified circum-
stances do exist. It is contended that the "may" 
in , subsection (1) means that the Minister has a 
discretion as to whether he initiates an inquiry 
pursuant to this section but 1 that being of the 
opinion required he is not bound to take any action 
under section 125B. 
Once the Minister has obtained a report and the 
dispute is still unsettled the options open to 
him are either to do nothing or to refer the matter 
to the Arbitration Court under section 125C. 
12sc 
20. 
Power of Minister to refer to Court 
- existing or threatened strike or 
lockout affecting essential industry 
or export slaughterhouse-
(1) Where the Minister receives a report 
under section 12 SB ( 2) (b) of this Act, 
he may, if the dispute has not been 
settled or if a strike or lockout exists 
in respect of that dispute, refer the 
matter of the dispute to the Court for 
settlement. 
(2) Where the matter of a dispute 
is referred to the Court under 
subsection (1) of this section, the 
Court shall set a date for the hear-
ing of the dispute as a matter of 
urgency. 
(3) The hearing shall be dealt with 
in accordance with the practice of 
the Court and in accordance with any 
rules or regulations governing the 
procedure of the Court. 
(4) If, after inquiring into the 
dispute, the Court is satisfied 
that the strike or lockout or the 
threatened strike or lockout sub-
stantially affects or will substant-
ially affect the public interest, the 
Court shall make a determination -
(a) Settling the dispute; or 
(b) Prescribing the procedure to be 
followed in settling the dispute. 
(5) The determination of the Court 
shall be final and binding on the 
parties. 
(6) If, notwithstanding a determin-
ation under subsection (4) of this 
21. 
section, full work or the operation 
of any undertaking is not resumed, 
the Court shall, on the application 
of any of the parties or the Minister 
order a resumption of full work or, 
as the case may require, of the 
operation of that undertaking, unless 
the Court determines that there is 
good reason not to make an order 
under this subsection. 
The teeth to enforce these procedures are contained in 
the penalty provisions of section l25D. 
It should be noted that pursuant to section 125C(6) 
if the Minister makes an application to the Arbitration 
Court for an order for the resumption of full work the 
final decision as to the making of such an order rests 
with the court. 16 
Remaining in the area of provisions designed to achieve 
the settlement of a dispute and a return to work the 
Minister by sections 126 and 127 is given the power 
to call for a ballot on the issue of a return to 
work. 
16. Section 125B was used twice in 1982, one ~ase 
proceed&~ to the Arbitration Court pursuan~ to 
section 125C. From discussions with staff 
members of the Department of Labour. 
• 126 
127 
22 . 
Secret ballot on the issue of a return to 
work - At any time during the continuance 
of a strike in respect of a dispute of 
interest -
(a) The Court in its discretion; or 
(b) The Registrar of Industrial Unions 
in his discretion; or 
(c) The Minister, the Court, or the 
Registrar, on the request in 
writing of not less than 5 percent 
of those workers who are directly 
concerned in the strike -
may conduct or cause to be conduct-
ed, in the prescribed manner, a 
a secret ballot of all workers 
directly concerned in the strike 
oh the issue of a return to work. 
Secret ballot on the issue of a resumption 
of operation of undertakings - At any time 
during the continuance of a lockout in 
respect of a dispute of interest -
(a) The Court in its discretion; or 
(b) The Registrar of Industrial Unions 
in his discretion; or 
(c) The Minister, the Court, or the 
Registrar, on request in writing 
of one or more employers who are 
directly concerned in the lockout -
may conduct or cause to be conducted, 
in the prescribed manner, a secret 
ballot of all employers directly 
concerned in the lockout on the 
issue of a resumption of the 
operation of the undertakings con-
cerned. 
2 3. 
It is to be noted that under both section 126 and 
section 127 the Minister is only able to act to 
require a ballot after he has been requested to do so 
by the prescribed number of workers or employers respect-
ively. This is to be contrasted with the discretions 
conferred on the Court and the Registrar of Industrial 
along with the power, as possessed by the Minister, to 
conduct a ballot upon request. It is arguable that in 
these sections "may" is only to be read as conferring 
a discretion when read with paragraphs (a) and (b). 
But that when paragraph (c) is being considered "may" 
is to be read as "shall" as (c) unlike (a) and (b) 
does not use the language of a"discretion". It is 
contended that if a discretion was intended to be 
given in the case of a request then the same formula 
of "in its discretion" would have been used throughout 
the section. The contro.ry argument is that all words 
are to be given their ordinary meaning, therefore "may" 
confers a discretion when read in conjunction with any 
of the three paragraphs. This would mean that the 
Minister could never be bound under section 126 or 
section 127 to conduct or cause a secret ballot to be 
conducted but.,he is powerless to exercise his discretion 
to do so without first obtaining the necessary written 
requests. 
• -• • • 
llll 
-• --• • • 
24. 
Currently it is doubtful that the scope of the Minister's 
discretions under either of these sections will be 
interpreted by the courts as they have never been used. 17 
The power to deregister a union in the event of a 
"discontinuence of employment" is also conferred on 
the Minister. The industrial conciliation and ~rbit-
ration system established in 1894 and continued by the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 is based upon unions of employers and 
workers being registered pursuant to the statute law . 
Only an association so registered can enjoy the benefits 
conferred by the legislation. For example, only a 
registered union of workers can negotiate for the inclus-
ion of an unqualified preference clause in their Award. 18 
The deregistration of a union means that it no longer 
has to abide by the requirements of the Act but also 
that it can no longer claim monopoly coverage of the 
workers or employers in that industry. Thus a new union 
may be registered effectively destroying the old one . 
The Minister has the exclusive power to deregister o.. u..l'\,o" 
pursuant to section 130 of the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973 . 
17. From discussions with staff members of the 
Department of Labour 
18. Section 98A Industrial Relations Act 1973 
130 
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Minister may cancel registration of union, 
or cancel award or agreement -
(1) If in respect of any discontinuance of 
employment the Minister is satisfied 
that it has caused or is likely to 
cause serious loss or inconvenience 
and that it has been brought about 
wholly or partly by any union of 
emplo~ers or of workers or by any 
member or members thereof, the Minister 
may, by notice in the Gazette, cancel 
the registration of the union, or cancel 
any award or collective agreement so far 
as it relates to the union, or cancel 
the membership of any specified class 
of members of the union. 
(2) Any notice under this section may be 
general or may be limited to any 
specified locality 
(3) Every notice under this section shall 
have effect according to its tenor, and 
shall take effect on the date of its 
publication in the Gazette, or on such 
later date as may be specified in that 
behalf in the notice. 
(4) On the cancellation under this section 
of the registration in respect of any 
lncality of any union registered in 
respect of any industry (whether that 
locality is the whole or part of the 
area in respect of which the union is 
registered), all awards and collective 
aqreements shall be deemed to be can-
celled so far as they relate to that 
union and to that locality or any part 
tlLereof; 
26. 
and thereafter, until the Minister 
consents thereto, no other union of 
employers or workers, as the case 
may be, shall be registered in respect 
of that industry and in respect of 
that locality or any part thereof 
and the scope of any other union 
of employers or workers, as the 
case may be, that is registered 
in respect of that industry shall 
not be extended to that locality or 
to any part thereof. 
(5) On the cancellation under this section 
of the membership of any specified 
class of members of any union, the 
following provisions shall apply: 
(a) The membership rule of the union 
shall be deemed to be amended so as 
to exclude members of that class from 
membership of the union or, where the 
notice is limited to a specified 
locality, to exclude them from member-
ship in respect of that locality; 
and members of that class shall there-
upon cease to be members accordingly; 
and 
(b) No award or collective agreement, 
so far as it relates to that union, 
shall apply to members of that class, 
or, where the notice is limited to a 
specified locality, to members of that 
class in respect of that locality or 
any part thereof; and 
(c) Until the Minister consents thereto, 
members of that class shall not be 
eligible to belong to any union reg-
istered in respect of the industry or, 
where the notice is limited to a 
specified locality, to any such union 
in respect of that locality. 
i. I • 
(6) For the purposes of this section, 
the expression "discontinuance of 
employment" includes the refusal by 
any employer to engage workers for 
any work for which he usually employs 
workers, the refusal of any workers 
to accept engagement for any work in 
which they are usually employed, and 
any method, act or omission in the 
course of employment that has or is 
likely to have the effect of interr-
upting or impeding the work in any 
industry. 
Section 130 (1) requires that before the Minister makes 
any decision concerning the deregistration of a union 
he must first be "satisfied" that the specified cir-
cumstances exist. Once he is satisfied of this, it is 
contended that, the words "the Minister may" confer a 
discretion on the Minister as to whether or not a union 
is to be deregistered. It is submitted that the Minister 
once satisfied, was not intended by Parliament to be 
bo-u.nd to deregister a union as the Act contains several 
alternative courses of action that the Minister may take 
where a discontinuance of employment exists. For example 
sections 120 and 121, as discussed above, could be applied 
because the section 123 definition of a"strike" includes a 
discontinuance of employment. To read "may" as "shall" 
in this section would be to improperly limit the sche~e 
of the Act. 
• • 
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The Minister's power is not confined to the deregis-
tration of a union but extends to the possibility of an 
association or its members being able to re-register 
as an industrial union pursuant to the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973. 
Upon deregistration the union's assets become subject 
to section~l31 to 134 whereby they are to be managed by 
the Public Trustee until a new union is registered in 
place of the old union . If no new union is registered 
then> pursuant to section 131 ( 1) (b) , within 6 months 
or within such further time as the Minister before the 
expiry of the said period of 6 months, may direct, the 
assets are to be distributed amongst the members of the 
deregistered union. The vesting of the assets in a 
new union is dependent upon the Minister exercising 
his power under section 134 whereby if 
"the Minister is satisfied that a 
new union of employer, or, as the 
case may require, of workers, re-
presenting the employers or the 
workers who were represented by 
the deregistered union has been 
registered under this Act, he 
shall, by notice in the Gazette, 
declare that -
(a) The new union has been so 
registered under the name spec-
ified in the notice; and 
(b) On the date specified in the 
notice (being the date of the 
notice or any later date), the 
assets of the deregistered union 
then vested in the Public Trustee 
shall vest in the new union ... " 
• • • • ---• • -on 
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Under section 134 there is again a requirement that 
the Minister be "satisfied" of the existence of certain 
specified circumstances. However in contrast to the 
use of "may" in section 130, the word "shall" is used 
in relation to notice being given in the Gazette. The 
different wording used in these sections could indicate 
that whilst a discretion was intended to be conferred 
in section 130 the notice requirements in section 134(1) 
are mandatory and must be fulfilled by the Minister once 
he is satisfied that a new union fulfilling the section 
134(1) requirements has been registered. One of the 
reasons for this difference possibly being that 1 the 
Minister has a number of options as to the action he m~i 
take in the event of an industrial dispute but that 
the registration of a new union to replace a deregistered 
one is a matter of public importance which should be 
publicly announced and so no option is given to the 
Minister. 
Even if no new union is registered the Minister pursuant 
to section 134(6) has the power to distribute the assets 
of the deregistered union. If the Minister "is satisfied" 
within six months or the period he has directed that a 
majority of the members of the deregistered union have 
become or desire to become, members of another union 
which they may lawfully join the Minister "may" , by 
notice in the Gazette, declare that the assets of the 
deregistered union then vested in the Public Trustee 
shall vest in that other union. 
• • • • • 
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A further result of deregistration is provided by 
section 142(2) which states that if a dispute relates 
to work formerly within the scope of a union that has 
been deregistered a conciliator "may" take action to 
recorrunend a conference in respect of that dispute only 
with the consent of the Minister . 
It can be argued that if the Minister is satisfied of 
the specified circumstances in section 134(6) that he 
should be bound to vest the assets in the new union . 
However the use of the word "may" prima facie confers 
a discretion on the Minister and such a discretion would 
be consistent with the wide powers concerning deregist-
ration and the distribution of assets given to the 
Minister under sections 129 to 136 . 
Section 142 cannot be interpreted in exactly the same 
manner as section 134(6) as consent of the Minister 
is a prerequisite to the exercise of any discretion 
which might be conferred by the use of "may", by. the 
conciliator. It is probable that a discretion is intended 
to be given to the conciliator because the recorrunendation 
of a conference is only one possible method of resolving 
a dispute. Th\s exercise of discretion is not based 
on a subjective judgement by the conciliator but upon 
the consent of the Minister. No grounds are defined by 
the statute on which the Minister is to decide whether 
or not to give his consent. This power again highlights 
the dominant role of the Minister in relation to 
deregistration of industrial unions. 
• • • • • • • • • --
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The ,..,inisterial power to deregister a union has been 
used seventeen times since 1939 when it was first 
introduced into the legislation. A list of these 
instances is contained in appendix 1. The threat 
of deregistration is often used as a weapon to 
threaten both public and private sector unions 
which may be contemplating some form of industrial 
action . 19 
19. For example, headline in Evening Post 
Monday 29th March 1982 
"PM threatens PSA with deregistration'.' 
To deregister the PSA special legislation 
would be required, as section 130 only 
applies to private sector industrial unions. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
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C. Ministerial Ballots 
The Minister, pursuant to section 101A as inserted by 
the section 16 of the Industrial Relations Amendment 
Act (No. 2) 1976, 
"may from time to time, by notice 
to the registrar, require a ballot 
to be conducted of all adult 
workers who will, if an ... 
unqualified preference provision 
is inserted or continues to be 
inserted in any award or collective 
agreement (including an award or 
collective agreement to be made in 
substitution for any existing award 
or collective agreement), be bound 
to become or remain members of a 
union of workers bound by the 
award or collective agreement." 
The Minister is required by subsection(2}to: 
(a) Inform the organisation known as 
the New Zealand Federation of Labour 
of his proposal to issue the notice 
and of his reasons for that proposal; 
and 
(b) Give the Federation a reasonable 
opportunity of consulting with him 
with regard to the issue of the 
notice . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • --
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Pursuant to subsection (4) a ballot shall not be 
conducted if, during the preceeeding three years 
a ballot has been conducted in accordance with this 
section. The actual procedure to be followed and 
the effect of the ballot are laid down in sections 
101B to 101E. The initial power of decision is in 
terms of the Minister "may" which in this context 
is contended to confer a discretion on the Minister 
as to whether or not a ballot is to be required . 
Following the insertion of the provision for a 
Ministerial ballot there have been seven ballots 20 
20 . section 101A ballots 
Golden Bay Cement Works Employees 
Canterbury Rubber Workers 
North Island (except Hawkes Bay and 
Wairarapa)Chemical Fertilizer Workers 
Wellington District Rubber Workers 
Dunlop N.Z. Ltd Upper Hutt Rubber Workers 
Nelson Timber Workers 
N.Z. Freezing Workers Clerical 
source: Report of Department of Labour 
for year ended 31 March 1979 
• • • ---• • -• • • • • • • • • 
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conducted pursuant to these sections. This section 
has not been used since 1979 following the insertion 
of section 175A by section 9 of the Industrial 
Relations Amendment Act 1978 which required 
every union wishing to insert an unqualified preference 
clause in an award or collective agreement to ballot 
its members on this issue every three years. These 
21 ballots are conducted by the Department of Labour. 
21. It is probable that section 175A will be repealed 
during the 1982 Parliamentary session by the 
provisions of the Industrial Law Reform Bill 1982 
which was introduced into the house on 
15 September 1982. I f passed this Bill will 
replace section 175A with a procedure whereby 
50 union members or 10 % of the financial 
membership, whichever is the lesser, may apply 
to the Registrar of Industrial Unions for a 
ballot to be held on the issue of the inclusion 
of an unqualified preference clause in an award 
or collective agreement . 
II 
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III WORDS CONFERRING POWERS 
The powers conferred on the Minister under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973, as outlined in Part II of this paper, 
result from several different formulations of statutory 
language. The important position of the Minister in the 
industrial relations field as evidenced by his many and 
varied functions under the Industrial Relations Act 1973 
is one factor which the court may take into account when 
considering a challenge to a Ministerial decision 
purportedly made in accordance with these provisions. 
The scope of the Minister's powers in each instance is 
however initially to be determined by an examination of 
the exact wording of the section in question. In the 
following analysis we will group together sections 
containing similar wording but the individual words 
must also be read keeping in mind the wider context 
of the section in which they appear. 
Pursuant to section 63(2) the Governor-General is to 
appoint conciliators on the recommendation of the 
Minister and by section 64(2) to appoint mediators on 
the recommendation of the Minister after consultation 
with the central organisations. The extra requirement 
on the Minister in section 64(2) was noted in Part II 
of this paper. In each instance all the Minister has 
the power to do,according to the words of the statute, 
is to recommend the people to be appointed to the 
services. In reality this power may be seen as analagous 
• 
• 
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to a power of appointment as the Governor-General 
invariably a ppoints to the Mediation Service and Concil-
iation Service the people recommended by the Minister. 
The power to recommend is not a power of final decision-
making and therefore may be likened to the Minister's 
powers to refer a matter to the Arbitration Court or to 
initiate a procedure such as a compulsory conference. 
In the majority of these provisions the Minister by the 
use of the word "may" in the statute is prima facie given 
a discretion as to whether or not he takes any action 
pursuant to that section. However, the preconditions 
such as the state of the Minister's knowledge before he 
is able to exercise his discretion are expressed in 
several different terms. 
Section 64 (9) gives the Minister power to appoint a 
temporary mediator in the following words; "the 
Minister may when he considers it desireable." 
The Minister's power to appoint a Deputy Chairman and 
deputy members of the Conscientous Objection Committee 
is conferred in the terms that the Minister "may" 
appoint such members "as he thinks fit" 
In both of the above sections the use of the term may 
can be interpreted as being intended to confer a discretion 
• I 
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as these are instances of temporary or additional 
appointments which will only be required to be made 
if the circumstances demand. These discretionary powers 
are exerciseable by the Minister following a judgment 
on the part of the Minister. That judgment is expressed 
by the statute in subjective terms in both cases although 
different language is used. It is contended that in 
effect the terms when he considers it desirable and as 
he thinks fit are equivalent in the standard they impose 
on the Minister as these terms are syno~ymous in 
ordinary usage and no special meaning is given to them 
by the Act. Both terms are highly subjective and if 
any difference in interprero-ho"' was intended by the use 
of these different phrases it is not immediately apparent . 
In both sections a use of the power by the Minister may 
prima facie be difficult to challenge due to the problem 
of obtaining evidence to prove that the Minister did not 
in fact consider it desirable or think it fit . 
Sections 12 SB ( 1) uses the phrase "where the Minister 
is of the opinion (a) That a strike or lockout exists 
or is threatened in an essential industry or an export 
slaughterhouse; and (b) That the strike or lockout 
substantially affects or will substantially affect 
the public interest - he may request a conciliator or 
mediator or some other person appointed by the Minister 
to inquire into the matter of the dispute." T\'\i& 
section,as was discussed in Part II above, would be 
1111 
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interpreted as conferring a discretion on the Minister 
as,to take action pursuant to this section is only one 
of the options open to him, in the event of a dispute, 
under the Industrial Relations Act 1973. But before 
the Minister can exercise that discretion he must be of 
the opinion that the specific circumstances described 
in paragraphs (a) and (b) exist. Whilst the requirement 
that the Minister be of the opinion is subjective the 
situation~outlined in (a) and (b) introduce some object-
ivity. It may be possible to obtain evidence as to 
whether a strike or lockout existed or was threatened 
however whether that strike or lockout substantially 
affected or would have affected the public interest is 
an issue more likely to be influenced by government 
policy and harder to prove before a ~ourt. The sub-
jective wording of opinion coupled with the criteria 
of substantial affect to the public interest means 
that the courts would probably be reluctant to 
intervene unless for example there was strong evidence 
to prove that no strike existed or was threatened and 
so there was no evidence on which the Minister could 
have formed his opinion. As both the circumstances in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) must exist in the opinion of the 
Minister, it would only be necessary to successfully 
challenge one of them. 
--• --
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The Possible avenues of challenging a decision of the 
Minister purportedly made pursuant to sections such 
as this will be considered in Part IV of this paper. 
However, it should be noted that the inclusion of a 
subjective standard such as "in the opinion of" will 
not in itself prevent the <ourts from inquiring into 
h . f h 22 t e exercise o tat power. 
Section 130(1) provides for the deregisration of an 
industrial union by the Minister. The power is in 
the terms that "if in respect of any discontinuance 
of employment the Minister is satisfied that it has 
caused or is likely to cause serious loss or incon-
venience and that it has been brought about wholly 
or partly by any union of employers or of workers or 
by any member or members thereof, the Minister may .... " 
As has been discussed above, it is contended that in 
this section may is used to confer a discretion on the 
Minister. Before that discretion can be exercised he 
must though,be satisfied that the specified circum-
stances do exist. Once again a subjective term has 
been used,which may be compared with the use of 
opinion in section 125B(l). The term satisfied can 
be argued to require the Minister to have a stronger 
basis for his decision than if he is simply to form 
an opinion. However the matters about which he is 
22. Reade v. Smith (1959] NZLR 996 
• -• • -------
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to be satisfied involve subjective judgment on the part 
of the Minister. For example it could be exceedingly 
difficult to prove that the discontinuance of employment 
was not likely to cause serious loss or inconvenience 
when the terms serious and loss or inconvenience are 
not defined in the Act and therefore under the section 
are open to interpretation by the Minister. The court 
would however be more likely to intervene if it was 
proven that there was no discontinuance of employment 
and therefore no evidence from which the Minister 
could have been satisfied. 
The same standard that the Minister be satisfied is 
also required by section 134(1). Pursuant to this section 
the Minister shall give notice in the Gazette declaring 
certain information when he is "satisfied that a new 
union of employees, or, as the case may require, of 
workers, representing the employers or the workers who 
were represented by the registered union has been 
registered under" the Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
The effect of the notice in the Gazette is to vest 
the assets of the deregistered union in the new union. 
Whilst initially the Minister is to be satisfied as in 
section 130(1) the use in section 134(1) of shall 
contrasts to the use of may in section 130(1). This 
can be seen as a deliberate change by the Legislature 
and that the meaning attached to such a change is that 
• • 
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a discretion is conferred by section 130(1) but that 
once the Minister is satisfied as required by section 
134(1) he is bound to issue the notice in the Gazette. 
Thus even if it could be proven that the Minister 
should have been satisfied under section 130(1) or 
shou\c\ have been of the opinion in section 125B ( 1) he 
could not be compelled to act under those sections as 
he still has a residu discretion. By comparison if 
under section 134(1) it can be proven that the Minister 
should have been satisfied then he is bound to act and 
may be directed to do so by the Court. 
Another different standard is imposed on the Minister 
by section 120(1) which also applies to section 121(1). 
A discretion, as contended in Part II above1 is conferred 
by the use of may in both sections 120 and 121. The 
Minister can only act in accordance with this discretion 
if he "has reasonable grounds for believing that a 
strike or lockout exists or is threatened''. This phrase 
is actually stated only in section 120 but is imputed 
into section 121 by the words in subsection (1) that 
"In any case to which section 120 of this Act applies 
the Minister may ... ". The term reasonable grounds is 
an easier standard for the Court to judge than whether 
the Minister is of the opinion or is satisfied. The 
Court may therefore be more ready to intervene on the 
grounds that the Minister did not have reasonable 
grounds than it would be where it must hold that the 
Minister was not of that opinion or could not have 
been satisfied. 
• 
----
• 
-
42 • 
In the instances of sections 120 and 121 the court would 
be able to hold that the Minister had improperly exercised 
his discretion if he did not have reasonable grounds for 
believing that a strike or lockout existed or was threat-
ened. The court could not however force the Minister 
to exercise his discretion to call a compulsory confer-
ence pursuant to section 120 or to appoint a committee 
of inquiry under section 121. In both of these sections 
the discretion implied by the use of may is reinforced 
as section 120 ( 1). reads "he may if he thinks fit, call 
a compulsory conference" and section 121(1) "the Minister 
may, if he thinks fit, instead of or in addition to call-
ing a compulsory conference, appoint a committee of inquiry .... " 
This subjective formula of "if the Minister thinks fit" is 
repeated in section 120(1) in relation to the conference 
of the power to make a decision settling the dispute 
on the chairman, and in section 121(2) with regard to 
a committee of inquiry consisting of one person. It 
emphasises the discretionary nature of the powers con-
ferred by sections 120 and 121 despite the stricter 
formula of the Minister having reasonable grounds 
for believing .... " 
Sections 101A(l) and 125C(l) ,it is contended,also 
confer a discretion on the Minister as to whether he 
takes any action pursuant to them however, his discretion 
in these sections rests upon the occurrance of specific 
events. The imposition of objective conditions is in 
contrast to the subjective ones discussed above and 
the difficulty of obtaining evidence to prove or disprove 
• 
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them would be lessened. It is submitted that the ~ourt 
would also be more willing to intervene where it could 
decide,whether the power had been properly exercised,on 
a question of fact . 
Section 101A(l) provides that the Minister may from 
time to time require a ballot to be conducted of the 
workers who will,if an unqualified preference provision 
is inserted or continues to be inserted in any award 
or collective agreement be bound to become or remain 
members of a union of workers bound by the award or 
collective agreement. The objective condition is 
therefore whether or not an unqualified preference 
clause is inserted in an award or collective agreement, 
which is a factual question that the courts would feel 
competent to deal with. 
Section 125C(l) is concerned with the power of the 
Minister to refer to the Arbitration Court an existing 
or threatened strike or lockout affecting an essential 
industry or an export slaughterhoue. The prerequisite 
conditions laid down by subsection (1) before the 
Minister can exercise his discretion to refer the 
matter to the Arbitration Court are that the Minister 
"receives a report under section 125B(2) (b)" of the Act 
and if the dispute has not been settled or if a strike 
or lockout exists in respect of that dispute." Here 
again the courts would be dealing with a question of 
• 
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fact as to whether a report had been received and then 
whether a strike existed. The latter issue in this case 
is not open to arguments concerning threatened disputes 
or possible losses but with more easily proven facts. 
The ~ourts may therefore be better able to gather 
evidence and be more willing to intervene than where 
questions of specialist judgment and Government policy 
may be involved. It must be noted once again though 
that if may is taken to confer a discretion on the 
Minister the ~ourt would be unable to force him to act 
even if the conditions in section 125C(l) had been met. 
It has been argued in Part II above that may in some 
provisions could be interpreted to mean shall. The 
provisions in which this is most likely to occur are 
sections 126 and 127. Pursuant to these provisions 
the Minister on the request of not less than 5 percent 
of the workers or employers directly concerned in the 
strike may conduct a secret ballot of all the workers 
or employers concerned in the strike on the issue of a 
return to work. Regardless of the interpretation given 
to may the requirement that a request from 5 percent of 
the workers or ernployes be made before the Minister can 
act is a question of fact which the court would be com-
petent to adjudicate on. A condition such as this may 
be contrasted with for example, the section 125B(l) 
condition that the Minister is of the opinion that 
the certain specified circumstances exist. 
• 
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If sections 126 and 127 are interpreted as imposing 
a requirement on the Minister to always conduct a 
ballot once the required request has been made then 
the courts would be able to order that the Minister 
is to conduct the ballot. 
The Act does in some sections use the term shall as 
for example in section 134(1) discussed above. In 
that section its use was coupled with the subjective 
condition of when the Minister is satisfied. In section 
101A the requirement on the Minister is phrased in a 
different way. Subsection (1) provides that where there 
is an unqualified preference provision in an award or 
collective agreement the Minister may require a ballot 
and issue a notice accordingly. However pursuant to 
subsection (2) before such a notice is issued the 
Minister shall (a) inform the Federation of Labour of 
his proposal to issue the notice and (b) give the 
Federation a reasonable apportunity of consulting with 
him in regard to the issue of the notice. In contrast 
to the use of may in subsection (1) the use of shall 
in subsection (2) can be seen as a deliberate difference 
which means that whilst the Minister has a discretion 
as to the decision whether or not to require a ballot 
once he has made that decision he is bound to act in 
accordance with subsection (2). If the Minister had 
issued a notice pursuant to subsection (1) without ful-
filling the conditions in subsection (2) the eourt 
• 
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may be persuaded that the Minister had improperly 
exercised his discretion. This type of argument may 
be made in the course of a challenge on the grounds of 
an abuse of ministerial discretion. This will be con-
sidered further in Part IV of the paper. 
The many and varied forms of language used in the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 to confer powers on the 
Minister highlight the importance of focusing on the 
exact words used in each case. The possible grounds 
for challenging a ministerial decision and the potential 
remedies available will depend on whether or not the 
statute confers a discretion, whether there are any 
prerequisite conditions that must be fulfilled before 
the Minister can exercise that discretion and whether+~~ 
conditions are in subjective or objective language. 
• • • • • 
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IV AVENUES OF CHALLENGE 
In this part of the paper we shall be concerned with the 
possibility of appealing against and seeking review of 
a ministerial decision purportedly taken pursuant to 
the powers conferred by the Industrial Relations Act 
1973. The result of any litigation in this area would 
depend on which particular power was being challenged, 
the statutory language in which that power was conferred 
and, of course, the material facts of the case. Thus 
the fol~wing analysis is not intended to answer the 
facts of any one case but to illustrate, firstly that 
there are potential grounds on which these ministerial 
decisions may be challenged, and secondly the possible 
attitudes of the ~ourts to such a challenge . 
A. Appeal 
There is no direct right of appeal from a decision 
taken by the Minister pursuant to the provisionsof 
the Industrial Relations Act 1973 conferred by the 
Act. An appeal could not be brought therefore which 
is solely concerned with the exercise of a power by 
the Minister under this Act. 
The issue of the validity of a ministerial decision 
taken pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act 1973 
could come before the Arbitration Court as a preliminary 
or subsidiary issue to a case which it is considering 
under its jurisdiction in section 48. For example a 
ballot ordered by the Minister pursuant to section 
101A may be called into question in a case concerning 
the rights of the parties under any award or collect-
ive agreement where the inclusion of an unqualified 
preference provision is at issue. 
Section 125C provides an avenue for challenging the 
Minister's decisions taken both under that section 
and section 125B. If the Minister does refer a dispute 
to the Arbitration Court pursuant to section 125C it 
would be open for the parties to argue that the Court 
had no jurisdiction as the Minister had improperly 
exercised his discretion pursuant to section 125C(l) 
to refer the matter to the Arbitration Court. 
Alternatively it might be possible for the parties to 
argue that the report received by the Minister was not 
made pursuant to section 125B as the Minister had 
invalidly exercised his discretion in making a referral 
to a conciliator, mediator, or other person pursuant to 
section 125B, in the circumstances of that particular 
case. 
Once the issue of the validity of a decision of the 
Minister purportedly made pursuant to a provision in 
the Industrial Relations Act 1973 is before the 
Arbitration Court the possibility of an appeal to 
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the Court of Appeal arises. The Arbitration Court's 
judgment concerning the validity of the Minister's 
actions could be appealed against to the Court of 
Appeal under section 62A. It is however, a limited 
right of appeal. 
Section 62A(l) Where any party to any 
proceedings under this Act is dissatified 
with any decision of the Court(other than 
a decision or the construction of any 
collective agreement) as being erroneous 
in point of law he may appeal to the 
Court of Appeal by way of case stated 
for the opinion of that Court on a 
question of law only. 
(4) In determining any appeal under this 
section, the Court of Appeal shall have 
regard to the special jurisdiction and 
powers of the Arbitration Court and, 
in particular, to the provisions of 
sections 48(4), 57(1), 226 and 229 
of this Act. 
(5) In its determination of the appeal, 
the Court of Appeal may confirm, modify, 
or reverse the decision appealed against 
or any part of that decision. 
(7) The determination of the Court of 
Appeal on any appeal under this section 
shall be final and conclusive. 
Despite the wide powers given to the Court of Appeal 
to determine a case the power to refer appeals back 
for reconsideration by the Arbitration Court is given 
by section 62B. Subsection (1) states that the Court 
of Appeal may direct the Arbitration Court to reconsider 
• • • • • • • • 
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either generally or in respect of any specified matters, 
the whole or any specified part of the matter to which 
the appeal relates. Subsection (2) provides for the 
Court of Appeal to give reasons for its referral of the 
case back to the Arbitration Court and to give to that 
Court such directions as it thinks just as to the 
rehearing or reconsideration or otherwise of the 
whole or any part of the matter that has been referred 
back for reconsideration. 
Another avenue by which an exercise of ministerial 
power may be questioned by the Court of Appeal is 
through section 51 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1973. Pursuant to that section the Judge of the 
Arbitration Court may of his own motion, or on the 
application of any party, state a case for the Court 
of Appeal. The case stated is limited though to a 
question of law excluding any question as to the 
construction of any award or collective agreement . 
Section 51 was amended to read as outlined above by 
the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1977. Prior 
to 1977 the power to state a case had been in the form 
"the Judge may on his own motion, and shall on the 
application of any party ... ". It is contended that 
the deliberate change in the language of section 51, 
which accompanied the insertion of the section 62A 
appeal rights, makes the section 51 power completely 
at the discretion of the Arbitration Court Judge. 
• • • • • • • • 
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Whilst section 51 does allow for a possible challenge 
to an Arbitration Court ruling the statement of a 
case under this provision is very different to 
the right of appeal by way of case stated conferred 
by section 62A. The section 51 procedure can only be 
invoked by the Arbitration Court and must be exercised 
before the Court has reached a decision on the matter 
before it. The Court of Appeal has no power to decide 
the case and can make no order modifying the Arbitration 
Court's decision as that decision will not have been 
delivered at the time that the Court of Appeal's opinion 
is sought. 
The Court of Appeal has adopted a similar approach to 
appeals by way of case stated on questions of law, 
pursuant to section 62A as it had previously taken in 
respect of section 51 and its equivalent in earlier 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts. In 
International Paints of New Zealand Ltd v. Hopper 23 
the Court of Appeal clearly expressed the manner in 
which the questions for the opinion of the Court 
b . 1 . 24 h were to e framed. In Internationa Paints t e 
Court concluded that the questions were too general 
2 3. {j_948] NZLR 240 
24. Idem 
Ill 
• 
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and declined to answer them. The Court of Appeal 
held that a case stated by the Arbitration Court 
should contain findings of all the relevant facts 
and should ask the particular questions of law which 
arise upon these particular facts. The Court emphas-
ised that its role was to answer questions of law in 
order to advise the Arbitration Court on how to decide 
the issue before it, and not to make findings of fact, 
or to give a treatise or exposition on various controv-
25 
ersial matters . . 
In an appeal pursuant to section 62A in the case of the 
New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v. The Northern (Except 
Kawerau and Caxton Paper Mills Ltd) Wellington and Otago 
and Southland Industrial District Woodpulp Paper and 
Related Products Industrial Union of Workers 26 the 
Court of Appeal was concerned with the interpretation of 
25. Cornish J. did however at length discuss the issues 
of the doctrine of substantiality compared with the 
doctrine of individisibility in effect giving such 
a treatise whilst not being prepared to answer the 
questions put. 
26. Unreported Cooke J. 4 May 1981 C.A. 181/80 
• 
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section 128(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 
which allows for the suspension of non-striking workers. 
When answering the questions put to it the Court of 
Appeal illustrated a reluctance to consider questions 
of fact in any form. In relation to the second question, 
"whether the worker's suspension on the 18th February 1980 
was justified at the time of such suspension?" the Court 
held that this was partly a question of fact, and that 
if the Arbitration Court had applied the wrong test the 
Court would have referred the case back to that Court. 
In answer to question one the Court of Appeal had already 
held that the Arbitration Court had applied the correct 
test. The Court of Appeal thus indicated that it would 
not have declined to answer the question or decided the 
issue itself but would have used the section 62B power 
to refer the case back to the Arbitration Court . 
The Court of Appeal was prepared though to answer 
questions three and four which it was admitted did not 
arise if the Arbitration Court's decision stood but 
Cooke J. considered that it was "better not to leave 
doubt in this sphere, we think we ought to answer them. 1127 
This contrasts with the decision in International Paints 28 
LAW Ll~".A,, t 
27. Ibid pl'l. ¥\CTORIA UN1VtKSl1Y Of WELLING 1JN 
28. Supra n.24 
• • • • • • 
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that the Court will not answer general questions, as the 
Court in this instance simply gave an interpretation of 
the phrase in section 128 "until the strike is ended." 
The Court of Appeal had initially noted its duty to 
consider the special jurisdiction and powers of the 
Arbitration Court. In respect of whether the onus 
of proof had been discharged in this case the Court 
of Appeal held that this was essentially a question 
of fact and that ·the Arbitration Court was entitled 
to reach the conclusion which it did on the evidence. 
The Court of Appeal was clearly leaving all findings 
of fact to be made by the Arbitration Court however, 
Cooke J. did make several comments which highlight 
some of the difficulties of this type of appeai. 29 
Some difficulty has arisen in 
dealing with the case because 
of some lack of clarity in the 
findings of fact and in the 
indication in the decision 
of the Court's approach. 
Perhaps this partly accounts 
for the present appeal. We 
recognise, however, that the 
Arbitration Court's jurisdiction 
is one with special problems and 
accordingly make these observations 
in no critical sense. 
29. Supra n.27 pp8-9 
• 
• 
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A deference to the Arbitration Court is also evidenced 
by the decision in Cornhill Insurance Co. Ltd v. 
1 d k d . 1 . f 30 New Zea an Wor ers In ustria Union o Workers . 
The Court of Appeal whilst concluding that the Arbit-
ration Court had interpreted section 150(2) incorrectly 
was not prepared to determine the (4>peal under section 
62A and remitted it to the Arbitration Court, with dir-
ections as to how to decide the issue, under section 62B. 
The Court of Appeal again showed a reluctance to state 
31 broad principles ·in Auckland City v. Hennessey 
stating that questions must be framed in a fact specific 
manner and declined to give answers to questions (b} and 
(c) which it saw as being "framed in absolute terms which 
neither require nor should be given answers that could 
32 be mistakenly applied to cases of very different facts." 
The Court of Appeal's preference for remitting cases 
back to the Arbitration Court was clearly expressed in 
the Wellington Road Transport Union of Workers v. 
Fletcher Construction Company Limited 33 case. 
30. []_9 80j 1 NZLR 
31.Unreported Somers J. 29 March 1982 C.A. 178/81 
32.Ibid plO 
33.Unreported Woodhouse P. McMullin J. Holland J. 
29,April 1982 C.A. 70/81 
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Counsel in this case were agreed that the Court of 
Appeal should determine the case but the majority of 
Woodhouse P. and McMullin J. were "unable to reach a 
conclusion as to what decision the Court wouhl have reached 
34 on a pt'Qper application of the onus of proof"~ 
All three judges in the Court of Appeal took account of 
the specialist nature of the Arbitration Court and stated 
that "within reasonable limits it ought to be left 
to develop its own methods and processess in order to 
find the just and fair solutions intended by the Act. 1135 
The Court of Appeal's approach to the section 62A 
appeal rights can be seen from the above judgments as 
being cautious not to take over the jurisdiction of the 
Arbitration Court. The most graphic illustration of 
this is the Court of Appeal's insistence on remitting 
cases back under section 62B rather than to determine 
the case itself under section 62A. The reluctance of 
the Court of Appeal to become finders of fact under 
section 62A may be important in respect of a challenge 
to the validity of a 11\inisterial decision. For example 
if a decision by the Minister to refer a matter to the 
Court pursuant to section 125C was being questioned 
facts such as whether or not the dispute had been settled 
34. Ibid McMullin J. p5 
35. Supra n. 34 Woodhouse P. p7 
• • 
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or if a strike or lockout existed in respect of that 
dispute would remain for the Arbitration Court to 
determine. It is apparent also that even if the 
Arbitration Court has misconstrued the law the Court 
of Ap~eal will correctly state the law but then remit 
the case back to the Arbitration Court for it to apply 
the law to the facts of the particular case. Thus if 
an issue arose pursuant to sections 126 and 127 the 
Court of Appeal would answer a question as to whether 
or not the Minister has a discretion but leave to the 
Arbitration Court to determine as a finding of fact 
whether five percent of workers or employees had 
requested that a ballot be held. 
Section 51 is unlikely to provide any wider avenue for 
challenging a ministerial decision than section 62A. 
The type of case which is most frequently referred to 
th f 1 . h f . . 36 e Court o Appea is tat o statutory interpretation. 
36. For example in Inspector of Awards v. Malcolm Furlong Ltd. 
1977 1 NZLR 36 the effect of the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973 on section 211 of the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1954 was considered. 
In Auckland Freezing Works and Abattoir Employees IUW 
v. Te Kuiti Borough 1977 1 NZLR 211 section 117 (4) 
was interpreted. In AHI N.Z. Glass Manufacturing Ltd 
v. North Island Electrical Related IUW 1977 Arb Ct 243 
the Court of Appeal laid down a test to distinguish 
between a dispute of interest and a dispute of right. 
58. 
Ti'tis section could be used by the Arbitration Court to 
define the width of the Minister's powers as conferred 
by statute. For example , whether the Minister had a 
discretion and if so what matters should he take 
into account. The question of whether the Minister did 
actually take account of these matters would doubtless 
be a matter of fact for the Arbitration Court and not 
the Court of Appeal. 
Thus an industrial union of workers deregistered by the 
Minister pursuant to section 130 could bring an action 
in the Arbitration Court to enforce an unqualified prefer-
ence provision in their collective agreement. The Arbi-
tration Court would be bound by section 98A to hold that 
as the union was not registered its collective agreement 
could not contain an unqualified preference provision and 
therefore the action must fail. Before the Arbitration 
Court had given a final decision in this case the opinion 
of the Court of Appeal could have been sought pursuant 
to section 51. This could only be on questions of law 
such as the interpretation of the section and the final 
decision would remain with the Arbitration Court. Once 
the Arbitration Court had delivered its judgment the 
union could then appeal on a point of law pursuant to 
section 62A. The union could approach such an appeal on 
the basis that the Arbitration Court was wrong in law in 
holding that they could not enforce an unqualified pr~f-
erence clause as the union was in fact still registered 
59. 
because the Minister's deregistration of the union was 
invalid. Questions of law could be argued concerning 
the interpretation of section 130 for example, the 
meaning of the phrase "discontinuance of employment." 
A question of law could also be framed to consider the 
level of proof required to show that the Minister was 
satisfied of the conditions specified in section 130. 
It is · contended that if the Court of Appeal adopts the 
approach evidenced above in previous appeals under section 
62A,it will take a narrow view of its jurisdiction and 
remit the case back to the Arbitration Court to apply 
the law as stated by the Court of Appeal to the facts 
as found by the Arbitration Court. 
The ability to appeal against a decision taken by the 
Minister pursuant to a section in the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 is not totally removed by the 
fact that there is no statutory right of appeal. The 
issue may be brought before the Arbitration Court and 
therefore _challenged in that forum. An appeal right 
pursuant to section 62A is then available. This is 
however a limited right of appeal which has been kept 
strictly within its statutory limits by the Court of 
Appeal. 
d 
d 
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B Review 
Judicial review of a ministerial decision purportedly 
made in exercise of a power conferred by the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 could be sought in the High Court 
under the provisions of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
It is intended .in our discussion of review as a possible 
avenue of challenging a ministerial decision to,firstly 
consider whether or not the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 
is applicable and secondly to outline some of the 
possible grounds on which judical review could be sought. 
Having established the scope of judicial review under the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 the availability and scope 
of review of a decision of the Arbitration Court will be 
determined. 
Provided that the decision being complained of falls 
within the ambit of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 
judicial review may be sought pursuant to that Act 
wit~out the need to specify the relief applied for in 
terms of a writ or order of mandamus, prohibition, 
certiorari or for a declaration or injunction. Section 
4(1) provides for an application for review in relation 
to the exercise, refusal to exercise, or pr,oposed or 
purported exercise by any person of a statutory power. 
The High Court pursuant to section 4(2) may declare 
that a decision made in the exercise of a statutory 
power of decision was un a uthorised or otnerwise invalid 
• • • • • 
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or the Court may set aside the decision. Subsection ( 5) 
allows the Court to direct any person whose act or 
omission was the subject-matter of the application to 
reconsider and determine either generally or in respect 
of any specified matters, the whole or any part of any 
matter to which the application related . 
Jurisdiction to decide applications for review pursuant 
to the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 is given to the 
High Court. This decision is then subject to appeal 
in the Court of Appeal. It is contended that even though 
an application for review concerns an industrial matter 
it will never be within the jurisdiction of the 
Arbitration Court. This is because of section 48(4) which 
states that "In all matters before it the Court shall 
have full and exclusive jurisdiction to determine them 
in such manner and to make such decisions, orders, or 
awards not consistent with this or any other Act, as in 
equity and good conscience it thinks fit." Thus whilst 
the deregistration of a union by the Minister pursuant 
to section 130 may fall within section 4 8 ( 2) (h) which 
gives the Arbitration Court jurisdiction to hear and 
determine questions relating to the registration of unions 
it would be inconsistent with the Judicature Amendment 
Act 1972 if the Arbitration Court heard an application 
for review made pursuant to that Act. Section 48(4) 
therefore has the effect of removing any possibility of 
• • • 
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review under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 being 
sought in the Arbitration Court instead of the High 
Court. 
In an action seeking review the applicant must satisfy 
the Court that review of a statutory power of decision 
is being sought, before the merits of the case may be 
assessed. By section 3 of the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972 a "statutory power" is defined to mean 
"a power or right conferred by or under any 
Act ... 
(a) To make any regulation, rule, by law, or 
order, or to give any notice a direction 
having force as subordinate legislation; 
or 
(b) To exercise a statutory power of decision; 
or 
(c) To require any person to do or refrain 
from doing any act or thing that, but 
for such requirement, he would not be 
required by law to do or refrain from 
doing; or 
(d) To do any act or thing that would, but 
for such power or right, be a breach of 
the legal rights of any person: 
(e) To make any investigation or inquiry 
into the rights, powers, privileges, 
immunities, duties, or liabilities 
of any person." 
A "statutory power of decision" referred to in paragraph 
(b) above is defined as 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
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(a) The rights, powers, privileges, imminities, 
duties, or liabilities of any person; or 
(b) The eligibility of any person to receive, 
a benefit or licence, whether he is legally 
entitled to it or not." 
If there has been no exercise of a statutory power the 
complainant may still have a cause of action under the 
prerogative writs rather than the application for review . 
It is submitted that all of the powers conferred upon the 
Minister by the Industrial Relations Act 1973 fall within 
the definition of a "statutory power" defined in the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972. This can be seen when 
the empowering provisions are examined . 
Sections 63(2) and 64(2) confer on the Minister a power 
to recommend to the Governor-General those to be appoint-
ed to the Conciliation and Mediation services. In these 
instances the Minister's decision as to the content of 
the recommendation he makes to the Governor-General 
affects the, powers and duties of the potential 
appointees . These powers therefore fall within 
"a statutory power of decision" as defined by section 3 
of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 . 
• 
64. 
The Court of Appeal in Slipper Island Resort v. Minister 
of Works 37 acknowledged that where a Minister's power 
to recommend is specially mentioned in a statute then 
that power may be subject to review. 
The appointment of a mediator under section 64(a) is a 
decision by the Minister which affects the powers and 
duties of a person and is therefore a statutory power 
of decision. The same analysis is also appropriate 
for the section 111(1) power of appointment to the 
Conscientious Objection Committee. 
Section 108(2) confers on the Minister power to appoint 
three persons to the Conscientious Objection Committee. 
A failure to make those appointments on the part of the 
Minister would not allow, those who wished to, to object 
to becoming union members. The Ministers decision there-
fore affects the rights of potential objectors and is 
reviewable under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
Sections 120(1) and 121(1) allow the Minister to call a 
compulsory conference or appoint a committee of inquiry 
respectively. The calling of a compulsory conference 
means that the parties to the dispute are required by 
law to attend. Such a requirement is however only 
imposed following a decision of the Minister pursuant 
to section 120(1). Thus the Minister is exercising a 
statutory power within the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972 definition. 
37 [198J] l NZLR 136, 139 
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Section 121(1) is also a statutory power, as an inquiry 
into the matter of a dispute would inevitably be an 
inquiry into the rights, powers, privileges, immunities, 
duties or liabilities of those involved. 
The decision to deregister a union pursuant to section 
130(1) falls within the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 
definition of a"statutory power of decision" as it is 
a decision which affects the rights, powers, privileges, 
immunities, duties, or liabilities of the individual 
union members and the union as a whole. 
The Minister by section 134(1) is given a discretion 
concerning the disposal of assets of a deregistered 
union, when exercising this discretion he is making a 
decision which affects the rights and liabilities of 
the members of the deregistered union and the new union. 
Accordingly the Minister's actions fall within the scope 
of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 as being a statutory 
power of decision. 
Sections 126 and 127 provide for a secret ballot to be 
conducted following a request to the Minister by five 
percent of those involved i~ a dispute. If the Minister 
has a discretion under these sections then they can be 
seen as falling within the definition of a statutory 
power as the secret ballot is called for by the Minister. 
II 
II 
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The workers are being required to do an act which, but 
for the Minister's decision, they would not be required 
by law to do. Alternatively if sections 126 and 127 
impose a duty on the Minister to conduct a ballot foll-
owing a request by five percent of those involved in 
a dispute, if the Minister fails to conduct a ballot 
his actions will be affecting the rights of those workers 
and therefore be a statutory power of decision open to 
review under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 . 
Section 101.A(l) confers on the Minister the power to 
require a ballot of the members of a union on the issue 
of the inclusion of an unqualified preference provision 
in an award or collective agreement. Such a power can 
be seen to fall within the definition of a "statutory 
power" in the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. It requires 
the members of the union concerned to vote in a ballot 
which, had it not been for the Minister's exercise of 
his powers under section 101A, they would not have 
had to participate in. 
Once it has been established that an exercise by the 
Minister of a power conferred by the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 falls within the scope of the 
Judicature Amendment Act 19721 judicial review pursuant 
to the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 provides a 
procedure by which the Minister's decision may be 
challenged. Some of the possible grounds available 
C-o, such a review action will now be considered. 
• 
• 
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(a) Improper Delegation 
An appropriate starting point when determining whether 
or not a decision purportedly made pursuant to the 
ministerial powers in the Industrial Relations Act 1973 
is reviewable is to consider the issue of who actually 
exercised the power in question. 
There may well be an evidentary difficulty of proving 
that a decision was not made by the Minister in person . 
This raises issues concerning the scope and availability 
of discovery and whether the doctrine of public interest 
immunity would prevent the relevant documents being 
obtained, It is not however the purpose of this paper 
to pursue these issues but simply to indicate their 
relevance in this context. If there is evidence 
available to indicate that the Minister in fact did 
not exercise the power conferred on him by statute but 
that the matter had been dealt with by a departmental 
officer the issue arises whether or not the Minister 
is able to delegate his powers. The answer may depend 
on the exact circumstances, that is, whether the Minister 
formally delegated his powers or whether his department 
exercised the power simply in the normal course of 
fulfilling its functions. 
The ability of the Minister of Labour to delegate powers 
conferred on him by Statute, including those under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 is governed by the Labour 
Department Act 1954. Section 7 states that: 
• • 
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(1) The Minister may from time to time, 
by writing under his hand, delegate 
to the Secretary all or any of the 
powers exercisablly by him under 
this Act or under any other Act. 
(2) Every delegation under this section 
shall be revocable at will, and no 
such de l egation shall prevent the 
exercise of any power by the Minister. 
(5) The fact that the Secretary or any 
person acting for the Secretary 
exercises any power of the Minister 
shall, in the absence of proof to 
the contrary, be sufficient evidence 
that he has been authorised to do so 
by a delegation under this section. 
Section 7 must be read subject to section 7A 
(2) the Secretary shall not delegate 
any powers delegated to him by the 
Minister without the written consent 
of the Minister ... 
When the Minister's power to delegate is expressly stated 
by statute it is contended that all delegation must be 
in accordance with that statute. The statutory provision 
must be read as replacing the constitutional convention 
stated in In re Golden Chemical Products Ltd
38 that the 
Minister was not obliged to exercise his powers personally 
even when those powers involved a serious invasion of the 
38. LL976J 1 Ch 300 
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freedom or property rights of the subject. It could 
be argued though that section 7 of the Labour Department 
Act 1954 should not be interpreted as widely as the 
constitutional convention. The basis for such an argument 
being that Parliament could not have intended the Minister 
to be able to delegate the more important powers conferred 
by any Act. For example, that because the power of the 
Minister to deregister a union pursuant to section 130 
of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 has very wide conse-
quences and may be seen as the most serious penalty under 
the Act that that decision should only be able to be 
made by the Minister,who is directly accountable to 
Parliament,and not a member of his Department. The 
section 130 power may be contrasted with the power to 
recommend to the Governor-General those to be appointed 
to the Conciliation and Mediator Services under sections 
63 and 64. In these sections the Minister does not have 
the power to make a final decision and it may be see n as 
rather more of an "administrative" task than the 
deregistration of a union. 
It is submitted however that if Parliament had intended 
such a limit to be placed on the Minister's power to 
delegate it would have been specif~cal~ included in 
the statute as it is in the Immigration Act 1964 at 
section 39 
(1) The Minister may from time to time, 
by writing under his hand, delegate 
to any Immigration Officer all or 
any of the powers (except this 
present power of delegation and any 
powers conferred on the Minister by 
section 19, section 22 or section 32 
of this Act) exercisable by the 
Minister under this Act. 
The exceptions include the important areas of granting 
exemptions from the requirements of the Act and determin-
ing the grounds for deportation. The fact that no 
exceptions are stated in section 7 of the Labour 
Department Act 1954 would indicate that all the Minister's 
powers conferred by the Industrial Relations Act 1973 
are able to be delegatea. 
The restriction placed on the delegation of the Minister's 
powers by the Secretary to other members of the Department 
imposed by section 7A(2) of the Labour Department Act 1954 
could provide grounds for review. The evidence required 
would be that the Secretary had delegated powers delegated 
to him by the Minister without the necessary written 
consent. Apart from this exception section 7(5) of the 
Labour Department Act 1954 imposes a rebuttable pre-
sumption that all exercises of the Minister's powers 
are authorised. Whether or not it could be rebutted 
and provide grounds for review would depend on the evidence 
available in each case. 
71. 
(b) Breach of Natural Justice 
Circumstances may arise where a decision made or action 
taken by the Minister pursuant to any one of his powers 
conferred by the Industrial Relations Act 1973 is open 
to challenge on the basis that there has been a breach 
of natural justice. The audi alteram partem rule which 
imposes the requirement that the parties be given adequate 
notice and opportunity to be heard39 has been restated 
in terms of a duty to act fairly in the recent New 
Zealand Court of Appeal decision of Daganayasi v. Minister 
f 
. . 40 
o Immigration. The court in that case clearly stated 
that whilst the requirements of natural justice vary with 
the power which is exercised and the circumstances it is 
not confined to those situations which may be labelled 
. d' . 1 41 JU icia. This decision is in line with the Privy Council's 
approach in Furnell v. Whangarei High School Board
42 that 
natural justice is but fairness writ large and juridically. 
h d 
. . 43 . . 
Te test espouse in Daganayasi constitutes a pragmatic 
approach, being expressed simply as "what fairness required 
in the present case. 1144 
39. de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
4th edition J.M. Evans ed. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
(Stevens & Sons, London, 1980) p.156 
(1980]2 NZLR 130 
Ibid pl41 
6-973]2 NZLR 705, 718 
Supra n.40 
Supra n.40 p25 
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When deciding what fairness requires in each case the 
court is in effect considering whether or not an extra 
requirement should be added to the words of the statute 
and if so what form it should take. For example as in 
Dagana~asi, that the party affected by the decision should . 
have a fair opportunity of correcting or contradicting 
. d' . 1 h' h . 45 any relevant statement preJu 1c1a to is or er view. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal considered the question 
of whether the principles of natural justice should be 
added in CREEDNZ Inc v. Governor-Genera1
46 . This case 
concerned the exercise of the Governor-General's power 
pursuant to section 3 (1) of the National Development 
Act 1979 to apply the procedures under that Act to an 
aluminium smelter and associated works proposed to be 
carried out by South Pacific Aluminium and the Otago 
Harbour Board at Aramoana. The case gives some indi-
cations as to the matters which the court will take 
into account when considering the applicability of the 
principles of natural justice. 
45. Supra n.40 p29 
4 6. Ul981]1 NZLR 172 
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The starting point for the Court of Appeal was to consider 
the wording of the specific provision and the broad purpose 
of the Act concerned. Cooke J.
47 in reaching his decision 
that no extra requirements were necessary placed emphasis 
on several specific points. The judge discussed the 
importance of the status of the person specified by the 
statute to make the decision in question. The imposition 
of consultation procedures in other sections of the Act 
and the finality of the decision when seen in the light 
of the overall scheme of the Act, were also considered. 
The type of issues involved, in the CREEDNZ Inc
48 
case were matters of national importance to New Zealand, 
were also taken into account. 
There is some overlap in the matters taken into account 
by the court in deciding the issue of whether the principles 
of natural justice require an additional element and the 
issue of exactly what form this extra requirement should 
take. It was the latter issue which was decided by the 
. . 49 h .· h 1 · k SC . Court in Daganayasi w ic , uni e CREEDNZ considered 
a decision regarding the personal circumstances of one 
individual. The decision in question made by the Minister 
of Immigration pursuant to section 20A of the Immigration 
Act 1964 was to decline to order that Mrs Daganayasi not 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
Ibid pp 177-178 Cooke J. 
Supra n.46 
Supra n.40 
Supra n.46 
• 
74. 
be deported from New Zealand. Cooke J. gave consideration 
to the wording of the specific provision and the scheme 
of the Act as a whole. The scope of the particular matters 
that the Minister was to have regard to were seen as 
important in the light of Lord Reid's comments in Ridge 
· 51 h . 20 . th v. Baldwin. Te section A power concerning e treat-
ment of an individual was contended to be easier for the 
courts to control than a large scale power. 
A further indication of the issues to be considered by 
the court is found in Cook J's reference to the Privy 
· 1 d . . . h d 52 Counci ecision in Durayappa v. Fernan o. In this 
case three matters, apart from the statutory language, 
were contemplated. These three factors were; firstly 
the nature of the property , the office held, status 
enjoyed or services to be performed by the complainant 
of the injustice; secondly, the circumstances or 
occasions in which the person claiming to be entitled 
to exercise the measure of control is entitled to 
intervene, and thirdly the sanctions that he is entitled 
to impose. 
It is submitted by the writer that a strong argument is 
able to be made for the imposition of an added require-
ment based on the principles of natural justice to 
51. 
52. 
(1964] A C 40, 71-76 
[1967] A C 337 
-
-• • 
75. 
section 130 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 and 
that the requirements to be added should be in the form 
of a duty on the Minister to consult with the parties 
involved before a final decision is reached . 
The section 130 power of deregistration is able to provide 
an example of how the right to seek review pursuant to 
the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 may be used to challenge 
the exercise of a ministerial discretion. This section 
may be considered by taking the same line of approach as 
theCourt of Appeal has espoused in CREEDNZ Inc
53 and 
. .54 d . h in Daganayasi. Here we are concerne wit a power 
which contains no procedural code or indication of the 
procedure it is contemplated that the Minister will use. 
In contrast to section 3(1) of the National Development 
Act 1972 this power has been conferred upon the Minister 
rather than the Executive Council. The courts, it would 
f 
. 55 
appear rom Daganayasi , are more willing to intervene 
in a decision taken by a Minister than the Executive 
Council. It was recognised by Cook J. in CREEDNz
56 
that the courts are very slow to impose a duty to follow 
a procedure at all analogous to judicial procedure upon 
the Executive Council. The safeguard in that case being 
seen in the strict criteria laid down by statute upon 
which the Governor-General in Council was to make his 
decision. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
In comparison section 130 does not contain the 
Supra n46 
Supra n.40 
Idem 
Supra n.46 pl78 
76. 
strong wording such as "is essential" of the National 
Development Act 1979 but rather only requiring 
satisfaction of the fact that it "is likely to cause 
serious loss or inconvenience ... ". 
The fact that the Minister's decision to deregister a 
union pursuant to section 130 is a final decision and 
not simply a decision to set an inquiry in progress 
or to start a statutory procedure in action is also a 
factor which may influence the court to impose some 
form of natural justice requirement. This is of course 
part of the argument concerning the overall scheme of the 
Act and whether it indicates that a court imposed proced-
ure is necessary. The purpose contained in the title of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1973 "to make provision for 
improving industrial relations" could be argued to 
illustrate that the intention of Parliament was that the 
Minister exercise his powers in the fairest way possible, 
to ensure that all parties received a fair hearing in 
order to attain and maintain harmonious industrial 
relations. 
The matters to be considered in the context of section 
130 can however be seen to have wider implications than 
the personal circumstances of the individual. Certainly 
it is the circumstances of each individual union member 
which are at issue but also at issue is the state of the 
industrial relations system in New Zealand. The weight 
given to this last issue by the court could depend on the 
circumstances of the particular case and the scale of the 
loss or inconvenience being considered. 
77. 
Assuming that a court was willing to impose a duty of 
fairness upon the Minister in the exercise of his power 
pursuant to section 130 the next step in the analysis is 
to decide what the duty to act fairly requires in this 
case. The same consideration as mentioned above that this 
may well be a case with wider implications than to a single 
individual would have to be weighed against the factors 
such as the nature of the interest involved. The power 
to deregister a union has been described as "the ultimate 
penalty" which "puts the union in the same precarious 
situation as an unregistered society, requiring total 
solidarity for survival ... ·~7 It is submitted that a 
union has a legitimate expectation that the weapon of 
deregistration will only be used after a serious industrial 
dispute has occured and that it will be exercised in a 
fair manner. The complainant, in this case a registered 
union, has a status that is of considerable value to it 
and in the majority of instances a union will be unable 
to survive once it has been deregistered. Thus the 
J 
sanction which the Minister can impose, that is 
deregistration, is seen in terms of being the most severe 
penalty under the Industrial Relations Act 1973. Its 
consequences are increased by the fact that the deregistered 
union may only be re-registered with the Minister's consent 
5 7. Geare New Zealand Industrial Relations: 
Legislation and Practice 
(Campbell & James, Dunedin,1979) pl23 
78. 
and so the possible long term effects are that another 
union will gain registration in place of the deregistered 
union and receive all the assets of the deregistered 
union under section 131. 
The minister is constrained to some extent by the circum-
stances in which he may exercise this power, which are 
defined in section 130(1). This can be seen to indicate 
Parliament's intention that the Minister is not to be 
totally free to exercise this power with no regard to 
procedural fairness. 
It is possible to argue that due to the extreme nature 
of this sanction that a duty of fairness imposes on the 
Minister a requirement to consult with the parties con-
cerned. Such consultation would give the union involved 
an opportunity to place its perception of the facts before 
the Minister and to rebut any inaccurate information which 
may have influenced the Minister in reaching his decision. 
A requirement to consult with the parties involved before 
a final decision is made would not be opposed to the 
scheme of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 as it is 
imposed in section 64(2) before the Minister recommends 
those to be appointed to the mediation service and in 
section 101A (2) before the Minister issues a notice 
requiring a ballot. The inclusion of the procedure of 
consultation in other sections of the Act may be interp-
reted as indicating a deliberate oN\~ssion by Parliament 
79. 
in regard to section 130. The Court of Appeal in 
Daganayasi 
58 was however prepared to impose a procedure 
on a section in the Immigration Act 1964 when other sections 
of the Act specifically provided for such a procedure. 
An alternative requirement which the rules of natural 
justice may be used to impose has been suggested to be 
that "the Minister must give the union an opportunity to 
be heard (on the factual question whether the necessary 
circumstances exist) before making the decision to 
deregister. 11
59 Termed in this manner there would be no 
duty imposed on the Minister to actively seek out the 
parties involved to determine if they have any represent-
ations to him but rather that the Minister must, if 
approached, be prepared to listen to any submissions made 
to him with an open mind. 
It is submitted that it is fair, taking into account the 
seriousness of deregistration, that those who will be 
affected by the decision should have an opportunity to 
place evidence before the decision-maker. It is further 
submitted that the parties involved should be afforded 
this right to make representations even where deregistration 
has been threatened by the Minister. It may be argued 
that where a threat of deregistration has been made foll-
owing exchanges between the union and the Minister 
5 8. 
59. 
Supra n. 40 
Mazengarb Industrial ~elations and Industrial 
Law 4th edition A. S zaka ts ed. (Butterworth·s, 
Wellington. 1982) pl51 
80. 
that all parties are well aware of the situation and the 
union knew that deregistration would follow if they took 
certain action. The recent Queen's Bench decision in 
Regina v. Secretary of State For the Environment, 
Ex parte Brent London Borough Council and Others
60 would 
indicate however that the Minister should always be ready 
to listen to any new representations. 
61 Brent L.B.C. 
concerned the adjustment and removal of a rate support 
to local authorities. Prior to the Act conferring the powers 
to alter the grants receiving the Royal Assent the Secretary 
of State had heard representations by local authorities 
potentially affected by the discretionary powers to be 
conferred on him. However, after the Act became law the 
Secretary of State had fettered his discretion and had 
not acted fairly by refusing to entertain a delegation 
of representatives of affected authorities without ascert-
aining whether they had any new representations to make. 
62 
The court in Brent L.B.C accepted that the Secretary 
of State was entitled to have well in his mind his 
policy and that keeping an open mind does not mean an 
empty mind but that his "mind must be kept ajar." This 
part of the natural justice argument is founded upon the 
maximum 111nemo judex in causa sua" which stands for the 
principle that the decider or decision maker should be 
60. 
61. 
62. 
[1982J 2 WLR 693 
Idem 
Supra n.60 p732 
81. 
. . . . l 63 disinterested and impartia. h 
. 64 
Te court in CREEDNZ 
whilst recognising the role of party politics in 
national development decisions was still prepared to 
question whether the Ministers had genuinely addressed 
themselves to the statutory criteria and were of the 
opinion that the criteria was satisfied. 
Again taking section 130 as an example, it is possible 
to see how the above test may provide a grounds for 
review in the appropriate circumstances. The Government 
in the field of industrial relations will usually have 
some form of policy in much the same way as it does on 
issues of national development. The court would then, 
following the CREEDNz
65 approach, consider whether the 
Minister had an open mind when he made his decision to 
deregister a union under section 130. For example 
whether or not he looked further than Government policy 
to deregister militant unions and replace them with 
unions sympathetic to the Government. This raises the 
second part of the question asked by the Court of Appeal, 
which in the circumstances of a section 130 i5.,whether 
the Minister had turned his mind to and been satisfied 
that in respect of a discontinuance of employment that 
it had caused or was likely to cause serious loss or 
inconvenience and that it had been brought about wholly 
or partly by any union or union members. Thus the 
6 3. 
64. 
65. 
Supra n.39 
Supra n.46 pl94 
Supra n.46 
82. 
evidence available to , the compainants would have to 
illustrate that the Minister had totally disregarded the 
factors that section 130(1) directed him to take into 
account. This again raises the issue of the importance 
of obtaining an order for discovery and the correspond-
ing issue of public interest immunity. 
It has been contended that the Minister's decision to 
deregister a union is "unreviewable" 
66 by the High 
Court. It is respectfully submitted by the writer that 
in view of the recent New Zealand and United Kingdom 
decisions and the arguments outlined above that the courts 
would be prepared to review the Minister's exercise of 
power pursuant to section 130 on the grounds of natural 
justice and to impose a duty to act fairly on the Minister. 
A likely form for the duty to take would be to impose the 
condition that the Minister be prepared to hear new re-
presentations with an open mind at all times before he 
makes his final decision. It must be noted however that 
the appropriate action to · be fair in each case may vary 
with the circumstances but that if natural justice is 
required, the need for urgency was held in Durayappah
67 
to be no justification for refusing it. 
66. 
6 7. 
Mathieson 
Supra n.52 
Industrial Law in New Zealand 
(Sweet & Maxwell, Wellington,1970) pl21 
8 3. 
That there has been a breach of natural justice could 
provide grounds for seeking review in relation to other 
decisions taken by the Minister under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 and not just section 130. For example, 
whether the Minister entered the consultation required 
under section 101A(2) with his mind "ajar",which raises 
the issue of the role of party policy. Taking into account 
the highly political nature of ballots on the insertion 
of unqualified preference clauses the occurrence of the 
consultation and the fact that the Minster had submiss-
ions from the Federation of Labour before him may be held 
to be sufficient. · 
The power to deregister a union can also be compared with 
the section 121 power of the Minister to appoint a 
committee of inquiry. In the section 121 case the Minister 
is not making a final decision but is initiating an inquiry 
into the matter of the dispute. It can be argued that 
the requirement for a fair hearing is fulfilled by the 
committee of inquiry and therefore a duty to hear repre-
sentations before the committee is appointed should not 
be imposed on the Minister. The preliminary nature of 
the decision was one of the arguments accepted by the 
Court of Appeal in CREEDNz
68 for holding that there had 
been no breach of natural justice. Thus the exact nature 
of the power is an important factor in determining whether 
judicial review can be sought on the grounds of a breach 
of natural justice. 
6 8. Supra n. 4-~ 
84. 
(c) Abuse of Discretion 
Not only may the Minister be required to keep an open mind 
on the matter in question but the courts have also been 
prepared to insist that the Minister must exercise his 
power only for the relevant purposes under the Act, 
taking into consideration only those factors which are 
relevant and disregarding all irrelevant factors. When 
considering an argument based on an abuse of a ministerial 
discretion the exact wording of the statute is of crucial 
importance. It is in this context that it becomes necessary 
to decide whether the Minister is bound to take the action 
laid down by the statute or whether he has a discretion. 
If the Minister is bound for example, in sections 126 and 
127 to conduct a ballot on the issue of a return to work 
if requested to do so by five percent of those involved, 
once that request is proven the Minister is acting ultra 
vires his power as long as he fails to conduct a ballot. 
However if the Minister has a discretion as to whether 
he conducts a ballot the evidence must go further than 
to prove that the request was received and that the 
Minister failed to conduct a ballot. There must be '"' o.Jd1tio I"'\ 
evidence of an improper use of the discretion. The 
manner in which a Minister is to exercise his dis-
cretion was stated by Lord Reid in Padfield v.Minister 
f . 1 . h . d d
6 9 . h f . o Agricu ture, Fis eries an Foo in t e ol~owing 
terms 
69. [1968j AC 997, 1 030 
85. 
Parliament must have conferred the discretion 
with the intention that it should be used to 
promote the policy and objects of the Act; 
the policy and objects of the Act must be 
construed by construing the Act as a whole 
and construction is always a matter of law 
for the court. In a matter of this kind it 
is not possible to draw a hard and fast 
line, but if the Minister by reason of his 
having misconstrued the Act or for any other 
reason, so uses his discretion as to thwart 
or run counter to the policy and objects of 
the Act, then our law would be very defective 
if persons aggrieved were not entitled to the 
protection of the court. 
first to construe the Act. 
So it is necessary 
Regardless of subjective wording in a ministerial dis-
cretion the courts are prepared to consider whether or 
not the Minister has correctly interpreted his powers, 
that is whether or not he has made an error of law. In 
Padfield
70 
that error was in relation to the purposes 
for which the power was exercised. In Fiordland Venison 
. 'l • • f . l d . h · 71 Ltu v. Minister o Agricu ture an Fis eries the issue 
was whether the Minister only took into account relevant 
matters and disregarded irrelevant matters. The Minister 
. . dl d . 72 d d in Fior an Venison was un er a uty to grant a game-
packing-house licence once he was satisfied of the five 
70. 
71. 
72. 
Idem 
Idem 
2 NZLR 341 
86. 
specific criteria listed. That subjective requirement 
did not prevent review and neither did the fact that the 
Minister had given no reasons for his decision. The 
court was willing to draw inferences as to the Minister's 
reasons from the evidence presented to it, but as in 
1 . k . 73 Rowing v. Ta aro Properties was not prepared to accept 
that the Minister's decision might have been based on 
relevant considerations. In these cases there was a 
willingness to examine other evidence in order to 
determine the Minister's reasons, which had not been 
present in the earlier case of 
74 
Martin v. Attorney-General. 
The latter case illustrates the importance of the exact 
wording of the statute as the court was able to hold that 
the purpose of closing the oyster season was simply to 
close the season 0.1,~ -\\..-"---\- was a relevant purpose under the 
Fisheries Act 1908. Tb\.s ma~~ irrelevant any discussion 
of the policy reasons behind the closure of the season. 
In the area of natural justice the issue of a fair 
hearing being given to ens~re that the decision-maker 
decided on the basis of correct information was considered. 
In the context of abuse of discretion it is also important 
that the Minister is deciding the matter on the correct 
facts. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
d . ' d 75 E ucation Secretary v. Tamesi e 
[1975J 2 NZLR 62 
[19 70] NZLR 15 8 
Q-977] AC 1014 
was a case in 
87. 
which by statute the Secretary of State for Education was 
given the power to act if he was satisfied of certain 
specified circumstances. Despite the subjective wording 
the House of Lords was prepared to consider whether or 
not those facts did exist. Lord Wilberforce stated:
76 
If a judgment requires, before it can 
be made, the existence of some facts, 
then1 although the evaluation of those 
facts is for the Secretary of State 
alone, the court must inquire whether 
those facts exist, and have been taken 
into account, whether the judgment has 
been made · upon a proper self-direction 
as to those facts, whether the judg-
ment has not been made upon other 
facts which ought not to have been 
taken into account. If these require-
ments are not met, then the exercise of 
judgment however bona fide it may be, 
becomes capable of challenge. 
Adopting this approach the courts are clearly prepared 
to review a Minister's actions regardless of the basis 
for his decision being termed in a subjective manner. A 
judido.l attitude of this nature is directly contrary to 
the view expressed by Mathieson 7; in support of his 
contention that the Minister's power to deregister a 
union is unreviewable, "the formula" is satisfied
11 
"involves a subjective rather than an objective inquiry, 
and the ... court would accordingly refuse to review the 
Minister's action." 
76. Ibid pl047 
77. Supra n.66 ppl20 - 121 
88. 
Whilst recent cases indicate a willingness on the part 
of the courts to grant review even where there is sub-
jective language, that language may still determine the 
remedy granted. Where the staute is in the terms that 
the Minister may if he is satisfied that certain facts 
exist, if the Minister has taken incorrect considerations 
into account the court will, as in Padfield78 and Takaro 7 ; 
direct the Minister to reconsider his decision in light 
of the law as stated by that court. The court will not 
impose its discretion and decide whether or not the 
Minister would have acted if he had made his decision on 
a correct legal basis. This approach is to be contrasted 
with the remedy given in Fiordland Venison 80 which was a 
declaration that the applicant was entitled to have the 
licence issued. The regulations in Fiordland Venison 81 
directed that the Minister shall issue a licence once 
satisfied of the f~ve specific criteria. The court came 
to the conclusion on the evidence before it that the 
applicant had satisfied the relevant criteria. Having 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
Supra n.69 
Supra n.73 
Supra n.71 
Idem 
89. 
interpreted shall to mean that the Minister was bound 
to issue a licence once those criteria were met there was 
no discretion for the Minister to exercise once the court 
had decided the criteria were met and therefore no reason 
to send it back for the Minister to decide. 
The Industrial Relations Act 1973 contains a wide variety 
of statutory powers conferred on the Minister in just 
as wide a variety of statutory language. It is contended 
that the courts would consider each case on its merits 
and not refuse an ·application for review merely on the 
grounds of the subjective wording used. For example, 
considering the Minister's power to deregister a union. 
The Minister's decision pursuant to section 130 could be 
challenged on the grounds that there had been an abuse 
of discretion. The circumstances of each case would be 
of overriding factor but the wording of the section ind-
cates some of the potential issues. It may be argued 
that there was in fact no discontinuance of employment 
although the wide definition of this term in section 130(6) 
which includes where there is likely to be an interruption 
of work could make proving this to the court difficult. 
The Minister's decision that he was satisfied that the 
discontinuance of employment had caused or was likely 
to cause serious loss or inconvenience and that it had 
been brought about wholly or partly by any union of 
employers or of workers or by any member or members thereof 
could be challenged on several grounds. It may be contended 
90. 
that the facts did not exist on which the Minister could 
base his decision, however the vague terms of serious loss 
or inconvenience would not be easily quantified. Alter-
natively it could be argued that the Minister had not 
exercised his power in accordance with the purposes of 
the Act, although the court would then be faced with 
deciding whether or not deregistr~tion of the particular 
union was likely to +'ne conduct of 
industrial relations which raises the issue of the place 
of government policy in the Minister's decision. If it 
could be proven to the court that the Minister was simply 
following Government policy and had not turned his mind 
to the criteria laid down in section 130 that would be 
seen by the court as an undue fettering of the Minister's 
discretion to the point where the Minister had in fact 
not exercised his discretion at all. For example, an 
election promise to deregister all purportedly "militant" 
unions which was then followed without regard to the 
specific conditions required by the statute would be 
viewed with disdain by the courts.
82 
82. See for example:Asher v. Secretary of State 
for Environment ~974J lCh. 208 
Bromley London Borough Council 
v. Greater London Council [982] 
2 WLR 62 
91. 
Thus, there are instances in which the exercise of the 
Minister's powers under section 130 could be challenged 
in the courts. The success of that challenge would depend 
however on the strength of the evidence available to the 
court. A lack of such evidence would probably mean that 
the court would be slow to intervene and more ready to 
give full effect to the wide language of the section, and 
to the fact that it is the Minister who is accountable to 
Parliament who is exercising this power. But even if the 
court could be convinced that there had been an abuse of 
discretion the courts would not make the decision whether 
or not to deregister a union as they could not determine 
what the Minister's decision would have been had he 
considered the matter according to law. 
The courts may find it easier to intervene in a challenge 
to the exercise of the power to call a compulsory 
conference in the case of a strike or lockout pursuant 
to section 120. The Minister under this section is to 
have reasonable grounds for believing that a strike or 
lockout exists or is threatened before he may exercise 
his discretion if thinks fit to call a compulsory confer-
ence. ~ 'd 83 In Tam~si e the House of Lords w~s prepared 
to consider whether the Secretary of State could have 
been satisfied that a local education authority had 
83. Supra n.75 
92. 
acted unreasonably. The court determined this question 
after considering the facts in depth. It is contended 
that the inclusion of reasonable in section 120 would 
provide the court with the basis for considering the 
weight of all the evidence available to decide whether 
there were reasonable grounds for the Minister's belief. 
It can be seen in terms of a question of fact as to the 
evidence before the Minister rather than a policy decision. 
The only discretion i" \he.. ~12.C.l"tol'\ \s conferred by the fact 
that the Minister may if he thinks call a compulsory con-
ference. Thus even if it could be proven that the Minister 
did have reasonable grounds he could not be compelled to 
call a compulsory conference. 
The requirement that the Minister have reasonable 
grounds in section 120 can be contrasted with the rather 
more indefinable conditions in section 125B. In part-
icular the Minister is to be of the opinion that the 
strike or lockout substantially affects or will substant-
ially affect the public interest. The court is less 
likely to intervene in the section 125B instance where 
Government policy would play a far larger role. 
It has been contended that" in relation to section 130 
"the use of formula" if t h e Minister is satisfied" 
means that his decision will be final and unreviewable, 
provided it is made on relevant evidence, for the purposes, 
d ' ' bl b ' 1 d ' ' II 84 an it is not so unreasona e as to e in aw no ecision. 
84. Supra n. 59 
93. 
It is submitted by the writer that these exceptions to 
the Minister's decision being final and~~~iewable are 
all substantial grounds within the ambit of a challenge 
on the basis of an abuse of discretion that are applicable 
to every discretion conferred on the Minister under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973. It is suggested that 
regardless of the subjectivity of the provision the courts 
will be prepared to review an exercise of ministerial 
discretion to ensure that the Minister has exe~cised his 
power for the proper purposes under the Act, that he has 
taken into account all relevant considerations, that he 
has not taken into account irrelevant considerations and 
that he has in fact addressed his mind to the matters at 
issue and therefore truly exercised his discretion. Whilst 
the scope of the courts inquiry will depend on the part-
icular section being considered and the evidence in the 
case, it is submitted that the issue of an abuse of 
discretion presents significant grounds on which to seek 
to review~ ministerial decisionmc.A~~l'\d.erthe Industrial 
Relations Act 1973. 
9 j_. 
(d) Bad Faith 
The extreme position which takes the argument of pre-
determination and bias one step further is to argue 
that the Minister exercised his power in bad faith. 
The Minister who simply follows in good faith Government 
policy according to what he sees as a mandate from the 
electorate cannot be challenged on the grounds of having 
acted in bad faith. By comparison a Minister is acting 
in bad faith if he has acted in a fraudulent or malicious 
manner. For example he may have exercised his power for 
a purpose for which he knows it was not conferred. An 
example of a malicious exercise of power is found in 
11 . l . 85 Roncare 1 v. Dup essis where the Minister was motivated 
to use his power out of personal animosity towards those 
affected. 
When the power conferred by section 130 is considered the 
evidentary difficulty of proving bad faith on the part of 
the Minister is enhanced by the subjective wording of 
is satisfied. The actual motive behind a decision by 
the Minister will generally be very difficult to prove 
except in a blatant case such as Roncarelli.
86 
85. U- 9 5 9] SC R 12 l , 14 l 
86. Idem. 
95. 
We have been considering in the foregoing analysis the 
possible grounds for review where it is sought in the 
High Court pursuant to the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
It is possible however that the issue of the exercise of 
a ministerial power could be argued before the Arbitration 
Court. The Arbitration Court would not have jurisdiction 
to consider an action seeking review under the Judicature 
Amendment Act but the decision of the Arbitration Court 
could itself be subject to review. 
Review of Arbitration Court decisions is limited by the 
privative clause contained in section 48(6) of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
( 6) Except on the 9:rounds of lack of jurisdiction 
or as provided in section 62A of this Act, 
no decision, order, award, or proceeding 
of the court shall be removed to any court 
by certiorari or otherwise or be liable to 
be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, 
quashed or called in question in any court. 
Th8 Arbitration Court by subsection 7 is defined to suffer 
from a lack of jurisdiction only where -
(a) In the narrow and original sense of the 
term jurisdiction, it has no entitlement 
to enter upon the inquiry in question; or 
(b) The decision, order, or award is outside 
the classes of decisions, orders, or 
awards which the court is authorised 
to make; or 
(c) The court acts in bad faith. 
96. 
The definition of lack of jurisdiction as found in 
subsection 7 was inserted by section 3 of the Industrial 
Re.\~tions Act 1977. There has been no clear definition 
by the courts as to the width of this ground for review 
either before or after the 1977 amendment. 87 The closest 
consideration of the phrase was in the Court of Appeal 
in New Zealand Engineering, Coachbuilding, Aircraft, 
d 1 d f b . . d h 88 Motor an Re ate IUW v. Court o Ar itration an Ot ers. 
The submissions in this case were however dismissed on 
substantive grounds without the Court of Appeal deciding 
whether jurisdictional errors had been pleaded. 
The reason for this was given by Richmond J. 89 
it is often difficult to draw a 
clear line between jurisdictional errors 
and errors within jurisdiction. I think 
it preferable in the present case to deal 
directly with the relevance of the matters 
referred to by counsel for the Union. 
Cooke J. does give some indication .as to the scope of a 
. 90 
review court 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
See New Zealand Textile and Garment Manufacturers 
Industrial Union of Employers v. Industrial 
Commission [976] 1 NZLR 241 
Northern Totalisator and Allied Employees Assn(Inc) 
v. Industrial Unions Registrar and Others 
G_97'2} 2 NZLR 22 
Ll-976] 2 NZLR 283 
Ibid p 295 
Supra n. 88 p301 
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courts of general jurisdiction should be 
slow to hold that when establishing a 
court or tribunal of limited jurisdiction 
Parliament rn,,! ant it to have authority to 
determine conclusively for the purposes 
of any given case the meaning of provisions 
in the Act by which it is constituted and 
under which it operates. 
This suggests that matters of interpretation should be 
reviewable by the courts but the extent of such review 
is unclear. Cooke J.'s comment must be read in the 
light of his statement above the passage quoted that, in 
this case it was unnecessary to discuss the various 
meanings in which the term "jurisdiction" is used, or 
error on the face of the record or privative clauses. 
The ambit of the power to review Arbitration Court decis-
ions is, due to the section 48 privative clause, a lot 
narrower than the scope of review sought under the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The ability to seek review 
of a decision of the Arbitration Court has been virtually 
replaced by the section 62A right of appeal on a point of 
law. The reluctance of the Court of Appeal to become 
finders of fact under section 62A leaves the possibility 
of a case seeking review on the grounds of a factual error 
which affects jurisdiction. This would be outside the 
right of appeal on an error of law compared with an error 
of law going to jurisdiction which would fall within · 
eection 62A. 
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The fact that there have been no cases seeking review 
since the introduction of the right of appeal would 
indicate that the right of appeal has largely replaced 
the areo...~covered by the limited ability to seek review. 
The right of appeal also provides the opportunity for 
the case to be decided by the Court of Appeal or remitted 
back rather than the single remedy of quashing the order 
or award available upon review. 
If a decision by the Minister, purportedly made pursuant 
to a power conferred on him by the Industrial Act 1973, 
has been subject to a decision in the Arbitration Court 
it is contended that the right of appeal given by section 
62A provides a wider avenue of challenge than the right 
to seek review. The scope of the appeal right was dis-
cussed at the beginning of P~r+ i~ of the paper. There 
is however the possibility of seeking review on the grounds 
of a factual error which goes to jurisdiction. For example, 
if the Minister refers a dispute to the Arbitration Court 
pursuant to section 125C it may be argued on review that 
the Minister had never in fact received a report under 
section 125B(2) (b) therefore the Minister had no power 
to refer the matter to the Arbitration Court and that 
court therefore had no jurisdiction to consider the dispute. 
It is the factual question of whether or not the report 
actually existed which would be at issue. The necessity for 
the factual error to affect the jurisdiction of the Arbit-
ration Court decreases the impact of this avenue of challeng-
ing a ministerial decision. 
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C. Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 
It would be possible in regard to any of the powers con-
ferred on the Minister by the Industrial Relations Act 
1973 to seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to the 
Declaratory Judgment Act 1908. Section 3 of the 
Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 provides that "where any 
person has done or desires to do any act the validity, 
legality, or effect of which depends on the construction 
or validity of any statute" that person may apply to the 
High Court for a declaratory order determining any question 
as to the construction or validity of the statute. 
The effect of a declaratory judgment, pursuant to section 
4 of the Act, is potentially very wide. An order is to 
be binding on the applicant, all persons on whom the 
summons had been served and on all persons who would have 
been bound by the declaration if the proceedings had been 
an action. 
Section 9 provides for a declaratory judgment or order 
to be made in anticipation of any event to have binding 
effect in respect of that future event. Section 11 
increases the availability of declaratory judgments to 
instances where the High Court has no power to give relief 
in the matter to which the judgment or order relates, or 
where such matter would be within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of any other court. This provision could be used 
to avoid the privative clause in section 48 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
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The High Court by section 10 is given a complete discret-
ion whether to make or give a declaratory judgment or 
order, and the High Court may, on any grounds which it 
deems sufficient, refuse to give or make any such 
judgment or order. 
The High Court pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act 
1908 could not be asked to determine the facts of a part-
icular case but must be presented with an agreed set of 
facts. The Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 could provide 
an avenue by which the Minister's interpretation of his 
powers under the Industrial Relations Act 1973 could be 
challenged. 
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D. Ombudsmen Act 1975 
The Ombudsmen Act 1975 does not provide the basis for 
a direct challenge to the Minister but an indirect challenge 
through the Department of Labour. This limitation is 
found in section 13 of the Ombudsmen Act 1975. Subsection 
(1) provides that the function of the Ombudsmen is to 
investigate any decision or recommendation made, or any 
act done or omitted, relating to a matter of administration 
and affecting any person or body of persons in his or its 
personal capacity.· The power to investigate a recommen-
dation made to a Minister is specifically conferred by 
section 13 (2). 
One advantage of an investigation by an Ombudsman is 
that pursuant to section 22 he may make a report con-
taining recommendations to the Department in far wider 
circumstances than that the decision was contary to law. 
The other grounds listed in section 22 (1) are: 
(b) Was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or 
improperly discriminatory, or was in 
accordance with a rule of law or a 
provision of any Act, regulation, or 
bylaw or a practice that is or may be 
unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or 
improperly discriminatory; or 
(c) Was based wholly or partly on a mistake 
of law or fact; or 
(d) Was wrong. 
The Ombudsman's report is however his only means of 
~ttempting to eNforce his recommendations. There is 
no legal duty on the recipients of an Ombudsman's report 
to comply with it. 
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In order to challenge a ministerial decision through a 
complaint to the Ombudsmen it would be necessary that 
officers of the Department of Labour had made some form 
of recommendations to the Minister. The final effect 
may be to in fact challenge the Minister's decision but 
even if the Ombudsman upholds the complaint his decision 
cannot be enforced against the Minister. 
The Ombudsman Act 1975 section 7 clearly indicates that 
a complaint to the Ombudsman is not to be regarded as 
an alternative to taking an action in the courts. Section 
7 (a) states that the Act shall not authorise the 
Ombudsman to investigate any decision in respect of which 
there is a right of appeal or a right to apply for review 
except if by reason of special circumstances it would be 
u~re.oson~ble to expect the complainant to resort or have 
resorted to it. It is submitted that the Ombudsman would 
be slow to invoke the proviso where a decision of the 
Minister under the Industrial Relations Act 1973 was in 
reality the decision being challenged. 
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V CONCLUSION 
The dominant position of the Minister under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 is a reflection of the interventionist 
role of the New Zealand Government in the industrial 
relations system. This inevitably leads to Government 
policy being seen as having a place in the determination 
of decisions by the Minister of Labour under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973. The mere fact that Government policy 
does have a place in the decision-making process should 
not of itself prevent the courts from considering in each 
individual case whether or not the Minister has acted 
according to law. It is not contended that the courts 
should replace the Minister's judgment with their own 
but that there is a legitimate place for the courts in 
ensuring that the Minister has acted within the confines 
of the power conferred on him by Parliament. 
It is the exact words of the statute which confer the 
power on the Minister which are of crucial importance. 
In relation to the possible avenues and grounds for 
challenging the Minister's decision considered it must 
be emphasised that the depth of the inquiry entered 
into by the courts will be largely delineated by the 
words used in the statute. Subjective wording alone 
will not prevent the court considering the basis on which 
the decision was made. The courts job is much easier 
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however if the Minister's decision is required to be made 
on a factual basis the existence of which the court is 
able to adduce from evidence placed before it. For example 
whether five percent of the union did send a request to 
the Minister. 
There are many different avenues by which the decision 
of a Minister under the Industrial Relations Act 1973 may 
be brought before the courts. It is the circumstances 
of the particular case which must determine which avenue 
is chosen and upon what grounds the decision is challenged. 
The courts in the past have not been called upon to consider 
the legality of ministerial decisions taken pursuant to 
powers conferred by the Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
This cannot be taken to indicate however, that the courts 
could not or would not consider such a case, if it arose, 
on its merits. It is contended that there is no power 
conferred on the Minister by the Industrial Relations Act 
1973 that is unreviewable and the legality of which cannot 
be challenged in the courts. 
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Appendix One 
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS DEREGISTERED IN NEW ZEALAND 
July 19 39 
November 1940 
January 1942 
March 1949 
February 1951 
March 
April 
April 
March 
May 
May 1962 
November 1971 
July 1975 
September 1976 
Otahuhu Chemical Manure Workers 
Wellington Tobacco Factory Employees 
(partial cancellation). 
Auckland Abattoir Assistants and 
United Freezing Works Employees (two 
partial cancellations). 
New Zealand (except Otago and Southland) 
Carpenters and Joiners and ,Toiners 
11 
Machinists (partial cancellation). 
New Zealand Waterside Workers. 
Wellington, Nelson, Marlborough and Taranaki 
Freezing Works, Abattoir and Related Trades 
Employees. 
Golden Bay Cement Company's Employees. 
Portland Cement Workers. 
Wellington Raod Transport and Motor and 
Horse Drivers and their Assistants. 
Ohura District Coalminers. 
Northern Industrial District Chemical 
Fertiliser Workers. 
Hawkes Bay Chemical Manure and Acid Workers. 
Wanganui Chemical and Acid Workers. 
New Plymoub.h Chemical Fertiliser Workers. 
New Zealand Seamen. 
Auckland District Boilermakers, Structural 
Metal Fabricators & Assemblers, Metal Ship 
& Bridge Builders(partial cancellation) 
Wellington District Boilermakers Metal 
Worker Assistants Iron and Steel Ship 
and Bridge Builder and Structural 
Steel Workers. 
Source: Registrar of Industrial Unions, 
Department of Labour. 
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